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REINVIGORATING CHAPTER 11:
THE CASE FOR REINSTATING THE
STOCK-FOR-DEBT EXCEPTION IN BANKRUPTCY
MICHELLE ARNOPOL CECIL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most bankruptcy scholars agree that chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code' is not working well in practice.2 Some conclude that it should be
abolished;3 others argue for its reform.4  Yet while these scholars
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Carrie Duff, Suzanne Johnson, Becky Owenson Kilpatrick, Carlos Lewis, and Jaime
Mendez for their invaluable research assistance and Cheryl Poelling for her indispensable
secretarial assistance. I am also grateful to Steve Ferris and Barbara Neilson for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
I. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at I 1 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)). Chapter II is contained
in sections 1101-1174 of the Bankruptcy Code, and focuses primarily on the
reorganization of financially troubled corporations.
2. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American
Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 314-15 (1993); Douglas G. Baird, The
Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128 (1986); James
W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory
and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2097, 2098 (1990)
[hereinafter Bowers, Groping and Coping]; Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The
Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1045 (1992); Timothy C. G. Fisher
& Jocelyn Martel, Should We Abolish Chapter 11? Evidence From Canada, 28 J. LEGAL
STUD. 233, 234 (1999); Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate
Reorganization: A Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REv. 669, 672 (1993);
Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and
Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79, 81 (1992); David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and
the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 465, 467. In an article
entitled The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, Professor Elizabeth Warren writes
a strong critique of the Bradley & Rosenzweig article. See Elizabeth Warren, The
Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 438 (1992). While she does
not explicitly state that chapter I 1 is in need of reform, she does recognize the need for
further debate in this area of the law. Id. For a critique of the articles by LoPucki and
Warren, see James W. Bowers, The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost
School of Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1773, 1774 (1993)
[hereinafter Bowers, Wisconsylvania].
3. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 2, at 313; Bowers, Groping and Coping, supra
note 2, at 2099-100; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1078.
4. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 2, at 128; Korobkin, supra note 2, at 734;
LoPucki, supra note 2, at 81; Skeel, supra note 2, at 510; see also Jagdeep S. Bhandari &
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vigorously debate such topics as whether chapter 11 only serves to protect
corporate managers and whether it provides a lesser return to
bondholders than did the old Bankruptcy Act,6 Congress is quietly and
systematically eliminating any hope for the continued viability of chapter
11 through a curious and unlikely mechanism: the Internal Revenue
Code.7 Its latest victim is a small and rather uncomplicated provision (by
Code standards) known as the stock-for-debt exception.8
Generally, when a creditor discharges indebtedness for less than its
face amount, the debtor must include the difference in gross income as
income from discharge of indebtedness, or debt discharge income.9 For
example, if a creditor agrees to accept $6,000 in full satisfaction of a
$10,000 debt, the debtor would recognize $4,000 of debt discharge
income. If, however, the debtor is either insolvent or involved in a
chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, the debt discharge income realized by
the debtor need not be recognized, or included in gross income, at that
time.' o Instead, the debtor must reduce its tax attributes, such as its net
operating loss carryovers and its tax credits, by the debt discharge
amount, on the theory that it is in a precarious financial position and is
unlikely to have the funds available to pay the tax on any debt discharge
income currently." The government recoups its lost revenue, however,
when the debtor becomes profitable following its reorganization and has
no net operating loss carryovers to offset against its taxable income.
Lawrence A. Weiss, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11: A Review of the Evidence, 67
AM. BANKR. L.J. 131, 149-50 (1993).
5. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1052-53; LoPucki, supra note 2, at
94-97; Warren, supra note 2, at 448-55; see also Stewart C. Gilson, Management
Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241, 241-42 (1989); Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 672-73 (1993).
6. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 1069-72; LoPucki, supra note 2, at
82-94.
7. Unless otherwise noted, the term "Code" in this Article refers to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
8. I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(B) (repealed 1993). For a complete discussion of the
stock-for-debt exception, see infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
9. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1994); see also United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284
U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
10. I.R.C. § 108(a)(l) (1994). For insolvent taxpayers, however, this exception
applies only to the extent of the insolvency. I.R.C. § 108(a)(3) (1994); see also infra notes
80-85 and accompanying text.
11. I.R.C. § 108(b) (1994). Alternatively, the debtor can elect to reduce the basis
in its depreciable property by the discharge of indebtedness income and leave its net
operating losses intact. I.R.C. § 108(b)(5) (1994). For an in-depth discussion of the tax
attribute reduction rules and the depreciable basis election, see infra notes 83-85 and
accompanying text.
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Prior to its repeal in 1993, there was a broad statutory exception to
these debt discharge rules. Originally created at common law,' 2 the stock-
for-debt exception provided that, if a corporation was either insolvent or
in bankruptcy and issued stock to its creditors in exchange for their
indebtedness, the corporation would not be required to include any
discharge of indebtedness resulting from the exchange in gross income,
nor would it be forced to reduce its tax attributes by a like amount. 3
When Congress codified the stock-for-debt exception in 1980, it
justified the exception as furthering the general policy goals of chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganizations, including rehabilitating rather than
liquidating financially troubled corporations, preserving countless jobs,
and fostering economic growth through increased competition. 4
Empirical evidence suggests that the stock-for-debt exception did, in fact,
promote these laudable goals of chapter 11. For example, conservative
estimates suggest that the stock-for-debt exception was used in eight out
of every ten bankruptcy reorganizations prior to its repeal. 5 Moreover,
without it, a number of large corporations, such as LTV and TWA, would
have been forced to liquidate, resulting in the loss of thousands of jobs
and devastating the national economy.
16
Yet despite the prominent role that the stock-for-debt exception
played in successful chapter 11 reorganizations, it was repealed as part of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993'7 without any public
hearings ever being held.18 Although a senate committee report suggests
that the exception was repealed because it distorted "the proper
measurement of economic income" and was unduly "complex and
cumbersome," it is clear from the repeal's location within the Act that the
exception was repealed merely to raise revenue for other special interest
12. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Capento Sec. Corp., 140 F.2d 382, 386 (1st Cir. 1946).
For a detailed discussion of the common law origins of the stock-for-debt exception, see
infra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
13. I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(B) (repealed 1993). This rule was subject to exceptions,
which are discussed infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
14. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,
7026; see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
6179.
15. Peter F. Blackman, Farewell to a Tax Break: Deadline Could Spur Rush of
Chapter 11 Filings, N.Y. L.J. Aug. 12, 1993, at 5 (estimate provided by Paul Asofsky,
prominent bankruptcy taxation scholar); see also infra notes 220-21 and accompanying
text.
16. Id.; see also infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
17. Omnibus Budget Reconcilation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13226
(a)(1), 107 Stat. 312, 487 (1993).
18. See, e.g., GORDON D. HENDERSON & STUART J. GOLDRING, FAILING AND
FAILED BUSINESSES: TAX ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY AND NONBANKRUPTCY
RESTRUCTURINGS OF TROUBLED CORPORATIONS 105 (1999).
2000:1001 1003
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provisions.' 9 In fact, when Congress initially proposed the repeal of the
exception in 1992, it was estimated to raise $286 million over five years.2°
Yet when the exception was actually repealed less than one year later, it
was estimated to raise $622 million over the same time period, an
astonishing 218% increase.2 ' In yet another procedural irregularity,
Congress delayed the effective date of the repeal for almost two years, an
unusual act at a time when Congress was often making tax legislation
applicable retroactively.22 One commentator has aptly referred to these
congressional attempts to repeal the stock-for-debt exception as a "rancid
piece of political pork., 23 It is obvious that the exception's repeal was
marked by hasty political maneuvering rather than by considered
legislative decision-making.
Even though Congress repealed the stock-for-debt exception in 1993,
because of the highly unusual delayed effective date of the repeal,
corporations governed by the new law are only now beginning to emerge
from bankruptcy. Thus, there is not yet any empirical evidence available
to document what impact the repeal of the exception will have on chapter
11 bankruptcy reorganizations.
The stock-for-debt exception was not free from valid criticism before
its repeal. Tax scholars had substantially discredited the purported tax
policy justifications on which it was based, the substitution of liability
theory and the subscription price theory.24 Yet this Article proposes that
another unarticulated but compelling tax policy justification supports the
stock-for-debt exception. Based on the open transaction doctrine
espoused by the Supreme Court in another context, the Article suggests
that, because the stock of an insolvent corporation or one involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding cannot be valued with any accuracy, it is
impossible to determine the true amount of debt actually discharged in the
stock-for-debt exchange or whether, in fact, any debt was discharged at
19. THE RIA COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACT OF
1993 WITH CODE SECTIONS AS AMENDED AND COMMITTEE REPORTS 736-37 (1993); see
also infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
20. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT TO H.R. 11 (Revenue Act of 1992) 3 (Joint Comm. Print 1992).
21. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF
THE REVENUE RECONCILIATION PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2264, 2 (Joint Comm. Print 1993); see
also infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
22. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §
13226(a)(3), 107 Stat. 312, 487-88 (1993). For criticism of this prospective effective date
by tax commentators, see infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
23. Paul H. Asofsky, Toward a Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1993, 51 N.Y.U. INST. ON
FED. TAX'N 13-1, 13-32 (1993).
24. See, e.g., Capento Sec., 140 F.2d at 386; see also Comm'r v. Motor Mart
Trust, 156 F.2d 122, 126 (1st Cir. 1946); Woodmont Corp. v. Comm'r, 5 T.C.M. 291, 293
(1946). Scholarly criticisms of these theories are outlined in detail infra notes 239-47 and
accompanying text.
1004
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all until the transaction is closed when the creditor later-sells the stock and
establishes its true value.25
Accordingly, this Article proposes that Congress reinstate the stock-
for-debt exception for corporations that are insolvent or in bankruptcy, so
that they recognize no discharge of indebtedness income and suffer no tax
attribute reduction at the time of the stock-for-debt exchange. It also
proposes that, based on the open transaction theory, Congress amend the
exception to require debtors to reduce their tax attributes at the time that a
creditor receiving stock in the exchange sells or otherwise disposes of it,
in an amount equal to the excess of the indebtedness cancelled over the
selling price of the stock (or its fair market value on the date of the
disposition if the creditor disposes of the stock in a transaction that does
not constitute a sale). The proposal resolves valuation issues raised by a
creditor's premature sale of the debtor's stock.26 This Article suggests
that such a proposal will harmonize the bankruptcy policy of
rehabilitating financially distressed corporations with the tax policy of
ensuring that true economic income is subject to federal income
taxation."
Parts II and El of this Article will trace the common law evolution of
the stock-for-debt exception and its statutory codification in 1980, with
particular emphasis on the stated policy justifications for the exception.
Part IV will then examine the history of the repeal of the stock-for-debt
exception, demonstrating that the repeal was the result of hasty political
maneuvering rather than reasoned legislative decision-making. In Part V,
the Article will first explore the exception's critical role in realizing the
fundamental rehabilitative goals of chapter 11 bankruptcy and will justify
the exception under both bankruptcy and tax theory. It will propose the
reinstatement of the stock-for-debt exception for insolvent corporations
and those in bankruptcy, and will resolve three tax issues relating to the
exception that remained unanswered at the time that the exception was
repealed. The Article will conclude that reinstating the stock-for-debt
exception will improve the success rate of chapter 11 bankruptcy
reorganizations and reduce the devastating economic impact of corporate
liquidations.28
25. Bumet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); see also infra notes 248-55 and
accompanying text.
26. Resolution of these vexing valuation issues is addressed infra notes 266-76
and accompanying text.
27. This Article suggests that bankruptcy scholars generally fail to consider the
tax implications of bankruptcy issues that they examine, while tax scholars are generally
unaware of the bankruptcy ramifications of tax issues. Thus, few, if any, articles explore
issues at the intersection of these two vast bodies of law. This Article takes the position
that this lack of attention to the intersection of bankruptcy and tax law is one factor
contributing to the demise of the chapter I I system.
28. For an earlier article suggesting that another amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code would produce similar results, see Michelle M. Arnopol, Why Have
Chapter II Bankruptcies Failed So Miserably? A Reappraisal of Congressional Attempts
2000:1001 1005
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II. THE COMMON LAW EVOLUTION OF THE
STOCK-FOR-DEBT EXCEPTION
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code requires a taxpayer to
include in gross income, "income from whatever source derived."2 9 The
Supreme Court has stated that gross income includes any accession to the
taxpayer's wealth.3° When a taxpayer borrows money, the loan proceeds
are not considered gross income because the taxpayer acquires a
corresponding obligation to repay the borrowed money and, thus, does not
have an accession to wealth.3' If, however, the taxpayer is relieved of the
obligation to repay the borrowed funds, then the taxpayer must include
the discharged debt in her gross income.32 This concept, referred to as
cancellation of debt ("COD") income, or debt discharge income, was first
recognized in the landmark 1931 Supreme Court case of United States v.
Kirby Lumber Co. 33 The policy justification for including discharge of
indebtedness in gross income enunciated by Justice Holmes in Kirby
Lumber was that the taxpayer experienced an increase in its net worth
when its assets were freed up as a result of extinguishing its liabilities at a
discount.34 Although Kirby Lumber's theoretical underpinnings have been
to Protect a Corporation's Net Operating Losses After Bankruptcy, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 133 (1992).
29. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1995).
30. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (stating that gross
income includes all "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion").
31. United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 946 (1968) ("A loan does not in itself constitute income to the borrower, because
whatever temporary economic benefit he derives from the use of the funds is offset by the
corresponding obligation to repay them."); see also Comm'r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408
(1946); Minnis v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 1049, 1056 (1979); Stayton v. Comm'r, 32 B.T.A.
940, 943 (1935).
32. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (193 1).
33. Id. In Kirby Lumber, Kirby Lumber issued its own bonds for approximately
$12 million and received par value on the sale of the bonds. Because of a decline in the
value of the bonds later that year, Kirby Lumber repurchased some of the bonds for less
than par value, with a price differential of approximately $137,000. The Commissioner
sought to tax Kirby Lumber on the $137,000 amount as an accession to Kirby Lumber's
gross income for the year. Justice Holmes, writing the opinion for the Court, agreed with
the Commissioner, holding that, as a result of the transaction, Kirby Lumber suffered no
reduction in its assets and recognized a clear gain. "As a result of its dealings it made
available $137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct...
[Kirby Lumber] has realized within the year an accession to income, if we take words in
their plain popular meaning, as they should be taken here." Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3.
See also Haden Co. v. Comm'r, 118 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1941) ("Assets to the extent
of $116,906.54, previously offset by liabilities, were freed from the claims of creditors,
and to this extent the petitioner thereby 'realized within the year an accession to income."'
(quoting Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3)).
34. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3. Commentators have often referred to this
policy justification as the balance sheet approach. Peter C. Canellos, Rethinking the Tax
HeinOnline  -- 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 1006 2000
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challenged by tax scholars,35 this net worth approach is consistent with
traditional notions of a comprehensive income tax base,36 and the concept
of including discharges of indebtedness in gross income is now clearly
embedded in the income tax system."
In an effort to provide relief from the harsh tax consequences of
Kirby Lumber, lower courts soon began creating exceptions to its strict
application.3 8  The first such exception stated that cancellation of
indebtedness was not included as income or gain if the taxpayer was
insolvent both before and after the debt discharge.39 This exception was
Aspects of Debt Restructuring, 70 TAXES 808, 810 (1992); Katherine Pratt, Shifting
Biases: Troubled Company Debt Restructurings After the 1993 Tax Act, 68 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 23, 26 (1994).
35. Boris 1. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income From the Discharge of
Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CAL. L. REv. 1159
(1978) (arguing that COD income can be justified not under a net worth or freeing of
assets approach, but rather under a tax benefit theory: "[Blorrowed funds are excluded
from gross income when received because of the assumption that they will be repaid in
full... [and] a tax adjustment is required when this assumption proves erroneous") (citing
to cases discussing the tax benefit theory); see also Theodore P. Seto, The Function of the
Discharge of Indebtedness Doctrine: Complete Accounting in the Federal Income Tax
System, 51 TAx L. REv. 199, 201-06 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court has recently
adopted both the net worth theory and the tax benefit rationale for COD income in United
States v. Centennial Say. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573, 582 (1991)). For a more complete
discussion of the impact of Centennial on the policy underlying COD income, see Paul J.
Sax, Supreme Court Decides Fundamental Debt Discharge, Loss Realization Issues, 75 J.
TAX'N 54, 54-56 (1991).
36. Over fifty years ago, two preeminent economists attempted to define an ideal
and comprehensive income tax base. These economists, Henry Simons and Robert Haig,
defined income as the sum of a taxpayer's consumption plus any changes in his net worth
over the relevant accounting period. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION:
THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938); Robert M. Haig,
The Concept of Income-Economics and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7
(Robert M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in IX READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54
(Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959).
37. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bryan, Cancellation of Indebtedness by Issuing Stock in
Exchange: Challenging the Congressional Solution to Debt-Equity Swaps, 63 TEx. L.
REv. 89, 96 (1984) ("Although the Court's analysis in Kirby Lumber . . . has been
criticized by commentators, the correctness of the result has rarely been doubted.")
(footnotes omitted).
38. Discharge of indebtedness is indeed one of the most complicated areas of tax
law, in part because it is fraught with exceptions. A discussion of all of these exceptions
is beyond the scope of this Article. One of the preeminent tax scholars of our day, James
Eustice, however, wrote an early article that attempted to grapple with these many
exceptions, such as how to define indebtedness, determining when it is discharged, the
effect of non-recourse indebtedness as well as debt-for-debt exchanges, and how
reductions in the purchase price of an item should be treated. Much of his discussion
remains relevant today. See James S. Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the
Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAX L. REv. 225 (1959). For
a more recent discussion of many of these issues, see Jack F. Williams, Rethinking
Bankruptcy and Tax Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 153, 155-78 (1995).
39. Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r, 70 F.2d 95, 96 (5th
Cir. 1934); Kramon Dev. Co. v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 342, 349 (1944). Several prominent tax
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premised on the theory that, because the cancellation of past due debts of
an insolvent debtor did not have the effect of increasing the debtor's
assets over his remaining liabilities, there was no freeing of assets, as in
Kirby Lumber; thus the transaction involved no element of gain or
profit.40 This insolvency exception was modified somewhat in cases in
which the debtor was insolvent before the discharge of indebtedness, but
became solvent as a result of the debt discharge. That line of cases held
that cancellation of indebtedness was included in the gross income of the
debtor only to the extent that the debtor became solvent as a result of the
discharge.4' The courts reasoned that the cancellation of a taxpayer's
indebtedness had the effect of increasing his assets over his remaining
liabilities, creating an accession to the taxpayer's wealth that was
includable in gross income.42
The second exception to Kirby Lumber created by the lower courts
has come to be known as the stock-for-debt exception. The leading case
espousing this exception was Commissioner v. Capento Securities Corp.
43
In that case, Capento Securities was organized as a subsidiary of
scholars criticize this exception because it is based on Kirby Lumber's freeing of assets
approach, rather than being based on a tax benefit theory. See, e.g., Bittker & Thompson,
supra note 35, at 1182-84.
40. Dallas Transfer, 70 F.2d at 96; Kramon, 3 T.C. at 349 ("A reduction in
outstanding liabilities which does not make a taxpayer solvent does not result in taxable
gain."). In Dallas Transfer, the court explained the theory behind the insolvency
exception best when it stated:
Taxable income is not acquired by a transaction which does not result in the
taxpayer getting or having anything he did not have before. Gain or profit is
essential to the existence of taxable income. A transaction whereby nothing of
exchangeable value comes to or is received by a taxpayer does not give rise to
or create taxable income.
Dallas Transfer, 70 F.2d at 96 (citations omitted). Commentators have argued, however,
that the common law insolvency exception was inconsistent with sound tax theory,
because loan proceeds usually generate current tax benefits to businesses (such as
depreciation deductions derived from property purchased with the borrowed funds);
therefore, there is no reason for excluding the discharged indebtedness from the taxpayer's
income. Canellos, supra note 34, at 811. But see Part III, infra, for a discussion of the
statutory codification of the insolvency exception, in which Congress rejected the theory
underlying this exception.
41. Haden Co. v. Comm'r, 118 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1941); Texas Gas Distrib.
Co. v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 57, 61-62 (1944); Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A.
289, 291-92 (1937).
42. Haden Co., 118 F.2d at 286 (holding that assets freed from creditors' claims
and no longer encumbered by liabilities result in taxable income); Texas Gas, 3 T.C. at 61-
62 ("[Wlhere an insolvent debtor, by reason of [the cancellation of indebtedness] becomes
solvent he realizes taxable gain in the amount of the assets freed from the claims of
creditors, i.e., to the extent by which the transaction renders him solvent."); Lakeland
Grocery Co., 36 B.T.A. at 292 (stating that Kirby Lumber was applicable to the extent that
Lakeland was solvent after the discharge because "the cancellation of [Lakeland's] debts
had the effect of making its assets greater than they were before that transaction
occurred").
43. 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944).
1008
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Raytheon Manufacturing for the sole purpose of purchasing $500,000 in
bonds that had previously been issued by Raytheon Manufacturing's other
subsidiary, Raytheon Production. The purchase amount of the bonds was
$15,160. Had Raytheon Production instead repurchased its own bonds at
a discount, it would have had a large taxable gain under Kirby Lumber.
The primary issue that the First Circuit faced was whether Raytheon
Production realized $450,000 in cancellation of indebtedness income
when it subsequently transferred its preferred stock, worth $50,000, 44 and
with a par value of $500,000, to Capento Securities in exchange for
cancellation of the bonds.45
The court held that, while Raytheon Production had discharged its
liability on the bonds,
it created a new stock interest which became a balance sheet
liability . . . . [T]o substitute a capital stock liability for a
bonded indebtedness may have its advantages ... but it cannot
be called a present realization of gain .... While the bond loan
has been terminated, the amount borrowed is now committed to
capital stock liability instead of to the liability of a fixed
indebtedness.46
In essence, the First Circuit adopted the theory that merely exchanging
debt, one form of corporate obligation, for stock, another type of
corporate obligation, was not an appropriate time to impose a tax. This
theory has come to be known as the "substitution of liability" theory.47
The court in Capento Securities espoused a second rationale in
support of its holding. Using what has come to be known as the
"subscription price theory, 48 the court held that a corporation does not
recognize gain or loss upon the issuance of its own stock, "and this would
44. Although the exchange involved the issuance of 5,000 shares of six percent
non-cumulative preferred stock with a par value of $100 per share, the stock was worth
only $50,000. The court was unaware of why the valuation discrepancy was present. Id.
at 386.
45. While the primary issue in the case was whether Raytheon Production
realized cancellation of indebtedness income, the initial aspects of the case dealt with
whether Capento Securities could claim that a transfer of the bonds in exchange for
Raytheon Production's preferred stock was a non-recognition transaction. The court held
that this was a recapitalization of the corporation and, because it was clearly done to allow
Raytheon Production to raise more capital, was not subject to recognition. Id. at 384-85.
46. Id. at 386.
47. Karrie L. Bercik, The Tax Consequences of Stock-For-Debt Exchanges, II
J.L. & COM. 201, 210-12 (1992); Seth M. Zachary & Jill Greenwald, An Analysis of the
Stock-for-Debt Exception to Cancellation of Indebtedness Income, 18 J. CoRP. TAX'N 144,
146 (1991).
48. See Bercik, supra note 47, at 210-1I; John C. Hart, Debt Restructurings May
Carry Increased Tax Costs Under RRA '90, 74 J. TAX'N 16, 20 (1991); Timothy C.
Sherck, Restructuring Today's Financially Troubled Corporation, 68 TAXES 881, 895
(1990).
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seem to be no less true when the subscription price, instead of being
newly paid, is the amount which has already been paid in as the principal
of the bond loan. 49
Shortly after the First Circuit established the stock-for-debt
exception in Capento Securities, it reaffirmed the doctrine in
Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust,50 despite the interim enactment of
statutory changes to the Bankruptcy Act that threatened to eliminate the
stock-for-debt exception.' Motor Mart Trust involved a trust taxable as a
corporation. Upon the trust's formation in 1926, it acquired a leasehold
interest and issued 5,000 shares of common stock with a value of
$500,000 for the interest. Motor Mart Trust erected a building on the land
and financed it by the sale of first and second mortgage bonds as well as
preferred stock. The building had a yearly depreciation of $47,700. The
trust became financially distressed and filed a petition for bankruptcy
reorganization in April, 1937. The reorganization plan involved a transfer
of preferred and common stock in exchange for the bonds. 2 All interests
of the old shareholders were completely extinguished in the
reorganization. This exchange resulted in a significant reduction in Motor
Mart Trust's existing liabilities.
The Commissioner initially took the position that Motor Mart Trust
had realized no taxable gain upon the exchange of its stock for debt, and
the court upheld the Commissioner's position. The court stated that "[a]t
the date of the reorganization the equity of the old shareholders had
vanished, and in substance the bondholders were the owners of the
company. This situation was merely given formal recognition ...the
bondholders changed their status to that of shareholders in the reorganized
company. ' 3
The difficulty in the case arose because, before the final order
approving the plan was entered, Congress enacted several new provisions
in the Bankruptcy Act (the predecessor to the Bankruptcy Code)
addressing the issue of cancellation of indebtedness income in bankruptcy
49. Capento Securities, 140 F.2d at 386.
50. 156 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1946).
51. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (the
"Bankruptcy Act") (amended by the Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §§ 268-70, 52 Stat.
840, 904 (1938) (the "Chandler Act") and the Act of July 1, 1940, ch. 500, § 270, 54 Stat.
709, 709 (1940)). For a more complete discussion of these provisions, see infra notes 54-
59 and accompanying text.
52. More specifically, the trust transferred 9,548 shares of preferred stock at fifty
dollars per share and 4,774 shares of common stock at five dollars per share in exchange
for the first mortgage bonds; 1,410 shares of common stock at five dollars per share in
exchange for the second mortgage bonds; and 253 shares of common stock at five dollars
per share to cover the compensation of the trustees under the bonds. Motor Mart Trust,
156 F.2d at 123.
53. Id. at 124.
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proceedings.54 In short, section 268 of the Chandler Act of 1938 declared
that no gain or profit would be deemed to have accrued to a corporation
modifying or canceling its debt in a reorganization in bankruptcy.55
Section 270 of the Chandler Act then provided that the basis of the
debtor's property in the bankruptcy reorganization must be reduced by the
amount of cancelled debt.5 6 As a result of these statutory changes to the
Bankruptcy Act, the Commissioner claimed that the basis of Motor Mart
Trust's property should be reduced by its cancelled debt; thus, he
disallowed the depreciation deductions taken on the property in 1939 and
1940 and assessed a deficiency.
The First Circuit disagreed with the Commissioner's position and
reversed the assessed deficiencies. The court reasoned that section 270
was enacted to prevent a "double deduction" when debt was forgiven
under section 268 that would otherwise have been taxable. The court
stated that Motor Mart Trust obtained no tax advantage from section 268,
"for upon consummation of the plan of reorganization the taxpayer
realized no gain which would otherwise have been taxable under the
provisions of the revenue acts. 57 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in
Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner,8 the First Circuit stated that,
in cases where no benefit accrued from the application of section 268, it
would be a penalty as well as a tax deterrent to bankruptcy reorganization
to apply section 270 to reduce the basis of the debtor's property. Thus,
the court, reaffirming the stock-for-debt exception previously established
in Capento Securities, concluded that there was no cancellation of
indebtedness within the meaning of section 270, but rather that the
54. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of the
statutory codification of cancellation of indebtedness income and its exceptions, see infra
notes 66-99 and accompanying text.
55. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 268, 52 Stat. 840, 904 (1938) (current
version at 11 U.S.C. § 3460)(1) (1994)); see also infra notes 69-70 and accompanying
text.
56. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 270, 52 Stat. 840, 904 (1938) (current
version at 11 U.S.C. § 3460)(5) (1994)); see also infra notes 71-72 and accompanying
text.
57. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d at 126.
58. 323 U.S. 141, 151 (1944). It is interesting to note that the Seventh Circuit
had rejected the stock-for-debt exception to Kirby Lumber in its entirety. Claridge
Apartments Co. v. Comm'r, 138 F.2d 962, 965-66 (7th Cir. 1943). Although the Supreme
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision, it did so on the ground that section 270 of
the Chandler Act could not be applied retroactively to the debtor in Claridge Apartments,
without passing directly on the viability of the stock-for-debt exception. Claridge
Apartments Co. v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 141 (1944). The Tax Court subsequently interpreted
the Supreme Court's opinion in Claridge Apartments as adopting the stock-for-debt
exception implicitly. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. A leading
commentator, however, believes that the Court's opinion could be read differently. Paul
H. Asofsky, Discharge of Indebtedness Income in Bankruptcy After the Bankruptcy Tax
Act of 1980, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 583, 606-07 (1983); see also Canellos, supra note 34, at
813.
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exchange of stock 'of Motor Mart Trust for its debt was for good
consideration. "The transaction may be considered a form of payment for
the bonds, not cancellation."'59
Following the First Circuit's decision in Motor Mart Trust, the Tax
Court decided several cases in rapid succession that firmly established the
stock-for-debt exception in the common law. In Tower Building Corp. v.
Commissioner,6° the Tax Court held that an exchange of Tower
Building's new stock for its secured and unsecured debt and old stock
under a plan of reorganization was not a cancellation of its indebtedness
under sections 268 and 270 of the Chandler Act.61 Therefore, the court
required no corresponding reduction of Tower Building's basis in its
assets. Similarly, in Woodmont Corp. v. Commissioner,62 the Tax Court
held that the cancellation of mortgages in a bankruptcy proceeding in
exchange for Woodmont's preferred and common stock required no
adjustment to the basis of the transferred assets because "[t]he obligation
owing to those who originally held bonds was continued in another
form. 63 Citing Motor Mart Trust and Tower Building Corp., the court
found no cancellation or reduction of debt by which the basis of
Woodmont's property should have been adjusted.64 After the Tax Court
handed down its decision in Woodmont, the stock-for-debt exception
appeared to have become firmly entrenched in the common law, and the
exception was subject to little case law dispute after 1946.65
III. STATUTORY CODIFICATION OF KIRBY LUMBER AND THE
STOCK-FOR-DEBT EXCEPTION
Until Congress enacted sweeping and comprehensive provisions
addressing the taxation of insolvent and bankrupt corporations as part of
the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980,66 statutory codification of bankruptcy
taxation provisions was sporadic and piecemeal. In 1954, more than
59. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d at 127.
60. 6 T.C. 125 (1946).
61. Id. at 134-35.
62. 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 291 (1946).
63. Id. at 293.
64. Id. The Tax Court reached the same result in Potter & Rayfield, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 119, 122 (1946); Alcazar Hotel, Inc. v. Comm'r, I T.C. 872,
879-80 (1943).
65. In 1947, the Internal Revenue Service [the "Service"] finally acquiesced in
three of the leading Tax Court cases that had established the stock-for-debt exception.
Tower Bldg. Corp. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 125, 137 (1946), acq., 1947-1 C.B. 4, Motor Mart
Trust v. Comm'r, 4 T.C. 931 (1945), acq., 1947-1 C.B. 3, aff'd, Comm'r v. Motor Mart
Trust, 156 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1946); Alcazar Hotel, Inc. v. Comm'r, I T.C. 872 (1943),
acq., 1947-1 C.B. 1.
66. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). For a discussion of these sweeping changes,
see infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
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twenty years after the Supreme Court rendered its landmark decision in
Kirby Lumber, Congress codified Kirby Lumber's cancellation of
indebtedness income doctrine.67  Section 61(a)(12) of the Code thus
provides that gross income includes "income from discharge of
indebtedness. 68
Even before Kirby Lumber was codified, the Chandler Act, which
amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 significantly, heralded the
codification of an important bankruptcy exception to Kirby Lumber's
COD income doctrine. 69  As discussed earlier, the codification was
contained in section 268 of the Chandler Act, which provided that any
corporation modifying or canceling its debt in a bankruptcy
reorganization would not be required to recognize any gain or profit as a
result of its discharge of indebtedness in the bankruptcy proceeding (the
"bankruptcy exception"). 70  As quid pro quo for the COD income
exception found in section 268, however, section 270 of the Chandler Act
provided that the debtor corporation was required to reduce the basis of its
property by the amount of debt cancelled or discharged in the bankruptcy
reorganization proceeding. 71 Thus, while Congress gave with one hand, it
67. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 61(a)(12), 68A Stat.
3, 17 (1954) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1994)).
68. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1994).
69. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
70. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 268, 52 Stat. 840, 904 (1938) (current
version at 11 U.S.C. § 3460)(1) (1994)). Section 268 of the Chandler Act provided in
pertinent part:
Except as provided in section 270 of this Act, no income or profit, taxable
under any law of the United States or of any State now in force or which may
hereafter be enacted, shall, in respect to the adjustment of the indebtedness of
a debtor in a proceeding under this chapter, be deemed to have accrued to or to
have been realized by a debtor, by a trustee provided for in a plan under this
chapter, or by a corporation organized or made use of for effectuating a plan
under this chapter by reason of a modification in or cancellation in whole or in
part of any of the indebtedness of the debtor in a proceeding under this
chapter.
Id.
71. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 270, 52 Stat. 840, 904 (1938) (current
version at 11 U.S.C. § 3460)(5) (1994)). Section 270 of the Chandler Act provided:
In determining the basis of property for any purposes of any law of the United
States or of a State imposing a tax upon income, the basis of the debtor's
property (other than money) or of such property (other than money) as is
transferred to any person required to use the debtor's basis in whole or in part
shall be decreased by an amount equal to the amount by which the
indebtedness of the debtor, not including accrued interest unpaid and not
resulting in a tax benefit on any income tax return, has been canceled or
reduced in a proceeding under this chapter.
Id. This section was amended in 1940 to provide that the basis reduction to the debtor's
property be capped at the fair market value of the property as of the date on which the
court enters an order confirming the debtor's reorganization plan. Act of July 1, 1940, ch.
500, § 270, 54 Stat. 709, 709 (1940). For a comprehensive discussion of the policies
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took away with the other. Although section 268 afforded a debtor
corporation relief from immediate recognition of COD income, section
270 exacted a "toll charge" for such relief by requiring the corporation to
reduce its asset bases, so that the government would eventually receive
the tax benefit of the corporation's discharge of indebtedness in the form
of larger gain when the corporation eventually sold its assets with their
reduced bases.72
In the early 1970s Congress appointed a special commission to
review the entire structure of the bankruptcy laws, which dated back to
1898.73 One of the Commission's consultants was William T. Plumb, Jr.,
arguably the most influential bankruptcy tax scholar of the twentieth
century. Although the Commission's report was quite comprehensive and
contained a full chapter addressing topics related to bankruptcy taxation,74
jurisdictional acrimony between the House Judiciary Committee,
responsible for the bankruptcy laws of the United States, and the House
Ways and Means Committee, with responsibility for federal taxation
matters, threatened to undermine the entire bankruptcy overhaul
process.75
The sponsors of the bankruptcy bill responded to this turf war by
removing all references in the bill to federal taxation matters. Thus, when
Congress enacted a sweeping overhaul of the bankruptcy system in the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978,76 the bill contained references only to state and
local income tax issues. All federal tax matters were introduced in a
separate bill,77 which was given lengthy consideration by the House and
Senate committees responsible for both tax and bankruptcy matters. After
underlying § 270 of the Chandler Act, see Claridge Apartments Co. v. Comm'r, 323 U.S.
141,149-52 (1944).
72. If the basis of depreciable property was reduced, the government would have
received the value of the corporation's discharge of indebtedness even earlier, in the form
of reduced depreciation deductions. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (1994).
73. S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong. (1970); see also H.R. REP. No. 91-927, at I (1970);
S. REP. No. 91-240, at 1 (1969).
74. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 277 (1973). In fact, Plumb wrote a series of
articles in 1974 and 1975 discussing these bankruptcy tax provisions and the policies
underlying them. William T. Plumb, Jr., The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws-Tax Procedures, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1360 (1975); William T.
Plumb, Jr., The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-
Reorganizations, Carryovers and the Effects of Debt Reduction, 29 TAX L. REV. 229
(1974); William T. Plumb, Jr., The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws-Priority and Dischargeability of Tax Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 991
(1974); William T. Plumb, Jr., The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on
Bankruptcy Laws-Income Tax Liabilities of the Estate and the Debtor, 72 MIcH. L. REV.
935 (1974). One scholar aptly stated that these articles are "a gold mine of legislative
history .... There is no doubt that the Plumb articles informed every change in the
legislative product that developed in the ensuing five years." Asofsky, supra note 23, at
13-5.
75. Asofsky, supra note 23, at 13-6.
76. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
77. H.R. 9973, 95th Cong. (1977).
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extensive testimony and debate,7" Congress passed the Bankruptcy Tax
Act of 1980 on December 13, 1980.' 9
The Bankruptcy Tax Act attempted to harmonize often conflicting
bankruptcy and tax policies in a comprehensive and systematic fashion.
To that end, it first codified in the Tax Code the bankruptcy exception
enacted over forty years earlier as part of the Chandler Act, and extended
it to insolvent taxpayers as well. Thus, section 108(a) of the Code
provides that gross income of a taxpayer does not include any amount that
otherwise would be discharge of indebtedness income to the taxpayer if
the debt discharge occurs either (i) in a title 11 bankruptcy proceeding, °
or (ii) while the taxpayer is insolvent.81 The legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Tax Act provides that the policy justification for this rule is to
"preserve the debtor's 'fresh start' after bankruptcy ... so that a debtor
coming out of bankruptcy (or an insolvent debtor outside bankruptcy) is
not burdened with an immediate tax liability."8 2
78. For an exhaustive history of the debates and hearings leading to the passage
of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, see Asofsky, supra note 23, at 13-4 to 13-14.
79. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980).
80. A taxpayer is entitled to rely on the title II exception only if the taxpayer is
under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court in a case commenced under title 11 of the
United States Code, and "the discharge of indebtedness is granted by the court or is
pursuant to a plan approved by the court." I.R.C. § 108(d)(2) (1994).
81. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1) (1994). That provision states:
(1) In general
Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this
subsection) would be includable in gross income by reason of the
discharge (in whole or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if-
(A) the discharge occurs in a title 11 case,
(B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent,
(C) the indebtedness discharged is qualified farm indebtedness, or
(D) in the case of a taxpayer other than a C corporation, the
indebtedness discharged is qualified real property business indebtedness.
Id.
If this gross income exclusion applies by reason of the taxpayer's insolvency,
section 108(a)(3) provides that the exclusion will only apply to the extent that the taxpayer
is insolvent. I.R.C. § 108(a)(3) (1994). Moreover, insolvency is defined in section
108(d)(3) as "the excess of liabilities over the fair market value of assets." The
determination of insolvency is made by looking at the taxpayer's assets and liabilities just
prior to the debt discharge. I.R.C. § 108(d)(3) (1994).
One issue that continues to perplex the courts is whether contingent liabilities, such
as guarantees, should be counted as liabilities for purposes of determining insolvency
under I.R.C. § 108(d)(3). In a recent case, Merkel v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 463, 484 (1997),
the Tax Court held that only those liabilities that the taxpayer is likely to be called upon to
pay (under a "more probable than not" standard) would affect the determination of
insolvency under section 108(d)(3) of the Code. Id. at 484. For a more comprehensive
discussion of this issue, see Celia R. Clark, COD Income: New Opportunities for
Insolvency Planning After Merkel, 89 J. TAX'N 29 (1998); see also Pratt, supra note 34, at
28.
82. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,
7025; H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 9 (1980).
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There is, however, a toll charge exacted from these taxpayers in
bankruptcy and insolvent taxpayers, codified in section 108(b) of the
Code. This provision modifies section 270 of the Chandler Act by
expanding the list of tax attributes affected by the taxpayer's cancellation
of indebtedness. Section 108(b) provides that the amount excluded from
a taxpayer's gross income by reason of section 108(a) must be applied to
reduce the taxpayer's tax attributes in the following order: net operating
losses ("NOLs"),s3 general business credits, minimum tax credits, capital
loss carryovers, the basis of the taxpayer's property, passive activity loss
and credit carryovers, and foreign tax credit carryovers.8 4 The Senate
83. Net operating losses are often the most valuable assets of a financially
troubled corporation, because they can shelter its income from federal income taxes when
it emerges from bankruptcy. For a more comprehensive discussion of the value of NOLs
generally, see Amopol, supra note 28, at 138-39; see also Valerie E. Burke & Gardner F.
Davis, The Forgotten Asset: Net Operating Losses of the Chapter II Corporate Debtor,
68 FLA. B.J. 69, 69 (1994).
84. I.R.C. § 108(b) (1994). That section provides in pertinent part:
(b) Reduction of Tax Attributes
(1) In general
The amount excluded from gross income under subparagraph (A),
(B), or (C) of subsection (a)(l) shall be applied to reduce the tax
attributes of the taxpayer as provided in paragraph (2).
(2) Tax attributes affected; order of reduction
Except as provided in paragraph (5), the reduction referred to in
paragraph (1) shall be made in the following tax attributes in the
following order:
(A) NOL
Any net operating loss for the taxable year of the
discharge, and any net operating loss carryover to such
taxable year.
(B) General business credit
Any carryover to or from the taxable year of a
discharge of an amount for purposes for determining
the amount allowable as a credit under section 38
(relating to general business credit).
(C) Minimum Tax Credit
The amount of the minimum tax credit available under
section 53(b) as of the beginning of the taxable year
immediately following the taxable year of the
discharge.
(D) Capital loss carryovers
Any net capital loss for the taxable year of the
discharge, and any capital loss carryover to such
taxable year under section 1212.
(E) Basis reduction
(i) In general
The basis of the property of the taxpayer.
(ii) Cross reference
For provisions for making the reduction
described in clause (i), see section 1017.
(F) Passive Activity Loss and Credit Carryovers
1016
HeinOnline  -- 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 1016 2000
2000:1001 Reinstating the Stock-for-Debt Exception 1017
Finance Committee explained that the policy underlying these attribute
reduction rules was to allow financially distressed debtors to defer
Any passive activity loss or credit carryover of the
taxpayer under section 469(b) from the taxable year of
the discharge.
(G) Foreign tax credit carryovers
Any carryover to or from the taxable year of the
discharge for purposes of determining the amount of the
credit allowable under section 27.
(3) Amount of reduction
(A) In general
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the reductions
described in paragraph (2) shall be one dollar for each
dollar excluded by subsection (a).
(B) Credit carryover reduction
The reductions described in subparagraphs (B), (C), and
(G) shall be 33 1/3 cents for each dollar excluded by
subsection (a). The reduction described in
subparagraph (F) in any passive activity credit
carryover shall be 33 1/3 cents for each dollar excluded
by subsection (a).
If a taxpayer is required to reduce the basis in her property under section
108(b)(2)(E), the basis reduction is capped at the amount by which the adjusted basis of
the taxpayer's assets exceeds the aggregate amount of her liabilities immediately after the
debt discharge. I.R.C. § 1017(b)(2) (1994). For an in-depth examination of these tax
attribute reduction rules, including the basis reduction limitation, see Asofsky, supra note
58, at 587-600; see also Bercik, supra note 47, at 206-09.
Alternatively, under section 108(b)(5), a taxpayer can forego reducing her tax
attributes in the prescribed order and instead elect to reduce the basis of her depreciable
property. I.R.C. § 108(b)(5) (1994). A taxpayer might choose to make such an election
when, for example, she plans to use her net operating losses in the near future and
preserving the net operating losses would be more beneficial on an after-tax basis than a
reduction in the basis of depreciable property, which would have the effect of reducing
overall depreciation deductions over an extended period of time. If a taxpayer makes this
depreciable property election, the basis limitation of section 1017(b)(2) described in the
preceding paragraph does not apply. I.R.C. § 1017(b)(2) (1994) (flush language). For a
more extensive discussion of the section 108(b)(5) election, see THOMAS J. CARROLL ET
AL., TAX ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY 24-26 (1992). In the case of both the basis reduction
required by section 108(b)(2)(E) and the alternative depreciable basis election of section
108(b)(5), regulations have recently been promulgated in final form prescribing the order
in which the basis of the taxpayer's assets must be reduced. For example, the regulations
provide that, in the case of the section 108(b)(2)(E) basis reduction, the taxpayer must first
reduce the basis in his real property held for investment or used in his trade or business, to
the extent that such property secured the discharged indebtedness. The basis of similar
personal property is next reduced, and so on. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(a) (as amended in
1999). For a more complete discussion of these complicated new regulations, see Harry
C. Steinmetz & William Morris, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Tax Developments of 1998: A
Look Back, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10 (1999).
Finally, it is important to note that if the debtor corporation has none of the tax
attributes enumerated in section 108(b)(2) and does not make the depreciable basis
election of section 108(b)(5), there are no tax consequences to the debtor's discharge of
indebtedness. It is not included in the debtor's gross income, nor does it carry over to
future years to reduce tax attributes in those years.
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including in gross income the income that they realize from discharge of
indebtedness, but not to allow them to exclude such amounts from income
forever. "[T]he rules of the bill are intended to carry out the
Congressional intent of deferring, but eventually collecting within a
reasonable period, tax on ordinary income realized from debt
discharge.' ' 5
One of the most controversial aspects of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of
1980 was the continued viability of the stock-for-debt exception. Early in
the debate, the Treasury Department made clear its position that the
common law stock-for-debt exception should be abolished, so that solvent
debtors would include in gross income the amount of indebtedness
discharged in excess of the indebtedness satisfied with stock, while
insolvent and bankrupt debtors would instead be required to reduce their
tax attributes by a like amount.8
6
The House of Representatives adopted a somewhat more moderate
approach, providing that the stock-for-debt exception would be fully
applicable for cases in which the creditor relinquished a security in
exchange for the debtor's stock, but would be inapplicable in all other
cases. 87 The apparent reasoning underlying this curious position was an
85. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,
7025; H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 9 (1980). This same policy justification was reiterated in
1993, when, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
66, § 13226, 107 Stat. 312, 488 (1993), Congress added minimum tax credits and passive
activity loss and credit carryovers to the list of tax attributes to be reduced by the debtor's
discharge of indebtedness.
86. The Bankruptcy Tax Act and Minor Tax Bills: Hearing on HR. 5043 Before
the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong. 9-10 (1979) (statement of Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, Department of the Treasury); Changes in Bankruptcy Tax Law: Hearing on H.R.
9973 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong. 79 (1978) (statement of
M. Carr Feguson, Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Department of Justice). For a
comprehensive discussion of the history of the controversy over the stock-for-debt
exception leading up to the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, see Asofsky, supra note 23, at
13-7 to 13-14.
87. For purposes of the House's proposed amendment to the stock-for-debt
exception, a security was defined as one that both (i) was in registered form or had interest
coupons attached, pursuant to section 165(g) of the Code, and (ii) qualified as a security
under section 354 of the Code (generally defined by case law as a long-term note, often
with a maturity often years or more). H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 2-3, 58 (1980); see also
H.R. 5043, 96th Cong. § 2(a) (1979).
It is interesting, however, that this was not the House's first position on the stock-
for-debt issue. Two years earlier, in 1977, a bill was introduced that would have fully
codified the common law stock-for-debt rule, except in cases where the indebtedness itself
was deductible when it was created. H.R. 9973, 95th Cong. § 102 (1977). This proposal
was attacked by interested parties on the ground that it would serve as an impediment to
rehabilitating failing corporations. Changes in Bankruptcy Tax Law: Hearing on H.R.
9973 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong. 143-46 (1978) (statement
of David A. Berenson on behalf of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Federal Tax Division); Changes in Bankruptcy Tax Law: Hearing on H.R. 9973 Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong. 120-24 (1978) (statement of John S.
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effort to coordinate the tax consequences of debtor. corporations with
those of their creditors. Thus, if a creditor exchanged a security for stock,
the exchange would be a nontaxable reorganization to the creditor,
requiring no recognition of gain or loss. In such a situation, the debtor
corporation likewise would not be required to recognize gain or loss on
the issuance of its stock in exchange for the creditor's security.88 If, on
the other hand, the creditor relinquished indebtedness that was not a
security (such as short-term trade debt) in exchange for the debtor's stock,
the exchange would be taxable, often generating a deductible loss to the
creditor. In this situation, the House reasoned that the stock-for-debt
exception should not be available to the debtor corporation, thereby
requiring it to recognize gain, in the form of a tax attribute reduction, in a
like amount.89
The bankruptcy and tax community harshly criticized the House's
proposal as antithetical to the rehabilitative goals of the legislation and of
bankruptcy law generally. They argued that the proposal would
discourage reorganizations and encourage liquidations.9" Finally,
witnesses testified that the distinction between securities and short term
indebtedness would discriminate against smaller businesses, who would
be less able to obtain long-term financing and, thus would be less able to
take advantage of the House's narrow stock-for-debt exception. 9'
The Senate Finance Committee was apparently influenced by this
unified opposition. It rejected the position of the House on the stock-for-
debt exception, and instead recommended that the common law rule be
retained, except in two limited instances in which the stock issued by the
corporation in exchange for its debt was de minimis. 92 The Committee
explained the policy rationale for its position as follows:
The Committee believes that by providing for favorable tax
treatment if stock is issued to creditors in discharge of debt, the
committee bill encourages reorganization, rather than
Pennell, Chairman, American Bar Association, Section of Taxation). For a
comprehensive examination of congressional attempts to codify the stock-for-debt
exception, see Asofsky, supra note 58, at 602-04, and Bryan, supra note 37, at 101-04.
88. H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 13 (1980).
89. Id. at 14-15.
90. SUBCOMM. ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., WRITTEN COMMENTS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF H.R. 5043,
BANKRUPTCY TAX ACT OF 1979 11-12 (Comm. Print 1980) (comments of Robert M.
Zinman, American Council of Life Insurance).
91. The Bankruptcy Tax Act and Minor Tax Bills: Hearing on H.R. 5043 Before
the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures ofthe House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong. 53-54 (1979) (statement of David A. Berenson, Chairman, Bankruptcy Task Force,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants); see also id. at 171-72 (statement of
John J. Jerome on behalf of the American Bankers Association).
92. For a comprehensive discussion of these de minimis rules, see infra notes
150-77 and accompanying text.
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liquidation, of financially distressed companies that have a
potential for surviving as operating concerns. However, the
committee does not believe that these rules should apply if only
a de minimis amount of stock is issued for the outstanding debt,
so that the general rules on debt forgiveness cannot thereby be
circumvented.93
The Senate's version of the stock-for-debt exception was ultimately
adopted as part of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980. 94 It provided in
pertinent part:
For purposes of determining income of the debtor from
discharge of indebtedness, the stock for debt exception shall not
apply-
(A) to the issuance of nominal or token shares, or
(B) with respect to an unsecured creditor, where the ratio
of the value of the stock received by such unsecured
creditor to the amount of his indebtedness cancelled or
exchanged for stock in the workout is less than 50 percent
of a similar ratio computed for all unsecured creditors
participating in the workout.95
At its statutory inception, the stock-for-debt exception applied
equally to solvent and insolvent corporations.96 Only four years later,
however, Congress limited the application of the stock-for-debt exception
to insolvent debtors and those involved in bankruptcy proceedings. 97 The
stated Congressional purpose behind narrowing the application of the
stock-for-debt exception was that it provided solvent corporations a
mechanism by which to manipulate the tax laws by engaging in debt-
equity swaps in order to improve their balance sheets without being
93. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,
7026.
94. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2, 94 Stat. 3389, 3394(1980) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 108(e)(8) (repealed 1993)). Although section
108(e)(8) of the Code was said to be the statutory codification of the stock-for-debt
exception, it actually contained only the two de minimis exceptions to the stock-for-debt
rule, thereby adopting the rule only by implication.
95. I.R.C. § 108(e)(8) (repealed 1993).
96. This is because the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 merely codified common
law, and the case that had first established the stock-for-debt exception, Capento
Securities, had involved a solvent debtor. The next major stock-for-debt case, Motor Mart
Trust, however, involved a debtor in bankruptcy. Capento Sec., 140 F.2d at 383-84; see
also Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d at 123.
97. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 59(a), 98 Stat. 494,
576-77 (1984) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 108(e)(10) (prior to 1993 amendment)).
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forced to realize taxable income. In the legislative history of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, the Conference Committee stated that the stock-
for-debt exception "allowed a corporation which retired existing
indebtedness for stock and then issued new indebtedness with a lower
principal amount and a higher interest rate to obtain a larger interest
deduction, notwithstanding that total debt payments (principal and
interest) may have remained unchanged. 98  Thus, to curtail the
burgeoning popularity of these debt-equity swaps, Congress limited the
application of the stock-for-debt exception to insolvent and bankrupt
companies that were unlikely to manipulate the tax benefits of the
exception.99
After the passage of the Bankruptcy Tax Act in 1980, the scope of
the de minimis limitation remained unclear, and the government did not
pass any regulations defining the parameters of the limitation for a full ten
years. Moreover, during that time period, questions arose as to whether
parent stock could be used to satisfy the stock-for-debt exception.
Finally, there was uncertainty regarding the extent to which preferred
stock qualified as stock under the exception.
It would be easy to label these issues as irrelevant because the stock-
for-debt exception has been repealed and, therefore, is dead letter.
Because this Article calls for its reinstatement, however, these issues will
resurface and must be resolved as part of the Article's proposal.
Accordingly, the status of each issue as of the stock-for-debt exception's
repeal in 1993 is discussed separately below.
A. Using Preferred Stock Under the Stock-for-Debt Exception
In the two leading cases establishing the common law stock-for-debt
exception, Commissioner v. Capento Securities Corp.00  and
Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust,'°' the court made no distinction
between issuing common or preferred stock to creditors in exchange for
their indebtedness. In fact, in Capento Securities, the debtor issued only
preferred stock (with a value of $50,000) in exchange for its creditors'
claims (with a face value of $500,000), and yet the First Circuit held that
the debtor did not realize any taxable gain in the exchange.'0 2 As a result
of these two leading cases, more than forty years elapsed before the
98. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 167 (Joint Comm.
Print 1984).
99. For a comprehensive discussion of debt-equity swaps and congressional
attempts to curtail them, see Bryan, supra note 37.
100. 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944). For a complete discussion of the Capento
Securities case, see supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
101. 156 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1946). For a more complete discussion of the Motor
Mart Trust case, see supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
102. Capento Sec., 140 F.2d at 386.
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Service first raised the issue of whether preferred stock should qualify as
stock for purposes of the stock-for-debt exception.
During this forty-year period, commentators questioned whether
preferred stock with a redemption price or liquidation preference that was
less than the amount of debt being cancelled in., the exchange should
qualify as stock under the stock-for-debt exception in full, or instead only
to the extent of its redemption price or liquidation preference.' °3 In 1988,
the Service issued its first ruling on this preferred stock question. In
Technical Advice Memorandum 88-37-00,1°4 the Service addressed the
issue of whether convertible preferred stock issued by a debtor
corporation in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding was "nominal or
token" within the meaning of section 108(e)(8)(A) of the Code, thus
disqualifying it from being considered stock for purposes of the stock-for-
debt exception.'°5 The value of the preferred stock was approximately ten
percent of the face amount of the indebtedness cancelled in exchange for
it. Moreover, the preferred stock was redeemable by the debtor
corporation five years after it was issued at a set liquidation value. It is
unclear whether the redemption price was equal to, or less than, the
amount of the indebtedness cancelled in the exchange.
The Service ruled that, although conversion and redemption features
could be considered in assessing whether stock was nominal or token
under the Code, the preferred stock issued in this exchange was not
nominal or token, and therefore qualified in full under the stock-for-debt
exception. Relying on the substitution of liability theory first espoused in
Capento Securities,'0 6 the Service ruled that the preferred stock issued in
the exchange was not nominal or token because it accounted for a
significant part of the consideration used in the exchange. It is unclear
from the language of Technical Advice Memorandum 88-37-001 whether
the preferred stock's conversion feature was a relevant factor in
determining that the stock was not nominal or token and qualified as stock
under the stock-for-debt exception. 0 7
103. See, e.g., HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 18, at 74-75; Sherck, supra
note 48, at 898-99; see also Robert D. Blashek, Tax Planning For Financially Distressed
Companies, 43 S. CAL. TAX INST. 1-1, 1-22 (1991).
104. Tech. Adv. Mem. 88-37-001 (May 10, 1988).
105. Id.
106. Id. The court stated:
The substitution of liability theory rests on the proposition that the substitution
of a capital stock liability for a bonded indebtedness cannot be called a present
realization of gain . . . .Because the exchange of liabilities is a mere
substitution, the transaction is not closed and gain or loss remains to be
measured at the time that the stock issued is extinguished.
Id.
107. After issuing Technical Advice Memorandum 88-37-001, the Service refused
to issue any private letter rulings on the issue of whether the stock-for-debt exception
could be invoked when only preferred stock was issued in the exchange. See, e.g., Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 90-19-036 (Feb. 9, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-12-039 (Dec. 22, 1989).
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Just two years later, the Service reversed its course on the preferred
stock issue. In Revenue Ruling 90-87,108 Z corporation, a debtor in a title
11 bankruptcy case, issued preferred stock with a redemption price and
liquidation preference of $300,000 to its creditor, C, in exchange for
indebtedness with a face amount of $500,000.09 Again relying upon
Capento Securities' substitution of liability theory, the Service ruled that
the stock-for-debt exception applied only to the extent of the preferred
stock's redemption price and liquidation preference. Accordingly, the
debtor corporation, Z, realized $200,000 of discharge of indebtedness
income, and was forced to reduce its tax attributes by a like amount." 0
The Service stated that "[u]nder the stock-for-debt exception, Z is
considered to have substituted a capital stock liability for the
indebtedness. Because the redemption price and liquidation preference of
the preferred stock are limited, however, the amount of the substitution is
limited.,,"'"
One week after the Service established its new ruling position on the
preferred stock issue in Revenue Ruling 90-87, Congress announced
legislation that took a markedly different approach to the issue. As part of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,112 Congress revised
section 108 of the Code to exclude "disqualified stock" from the
application of the stock-for-debt exception. Disqualified stock was
defined as stock that had a stated redemption price and either (1) had a
fixed redemption date; (2) was callable by the issuer; or (3) was puttable
by the holder of the stock. 13 If stock was deemed to be disqualified
stock, then it was treated as having satisfied the debt in an amount equal
to the fair market value of the stock at the time of issuance.114 According
to the Act's legislative history, the provision was designed to prevent the
application of the stock-for-debt exception to the issuance of preferred
stock that closely resembled debt.'15
The approaches taken to the preferred stock issue in Revenue Ruling
90-87 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 differed
108. Rev. Rul. 90-87, 1990-2 C.B. 32.
109. Id.
110. The $200,000 debt discharge amount represents the difference between the
$500,000 indebtedness and the $300,000 redemption price and liquidation preference of
the preferred stock issued in the exchange. Id. For a more complete discussion of the tax
attribute reduction required by Z's realization of $200,000 of debt discharge income, see
supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
111. ILd. (citing Comm'r v. Capento Sec. Corp., 47 B.T.A. 691 (1942), nonacq.,
1943 C.B. 28, aff'd, 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944)).
112. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11325,
104 Stat. 1388, 1466 (1990).
113. I.R.C. §108(e)(10)(B)(ii) (repealed 1993).
114. Id; see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-964, at 1099 (1990). The amendment
also provided that disqualified stock would not be considered stock for purposes of the
stock-for-debt exception's de minimis limitation. Id.
115. H.R. REP. No. 101-881, at 354 (1990).
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dramatically. In the revenue ruling, preferred stock was deemed to satisfy
indebtedness to the extent of its redemption or liquidation price.
Conversely, under the Act, preferred stock could satisfy indebtedness
only to the extent of the stock's fair market value at the time of issuance.
A simple example will help to illustrate the differing tax consequences of
these two approaches. Recall that in Revenue Ruling 90-87, Z
corporation's preferred stock had a redemption price and liquidation
preference of $300,000 and was exchanged for indebtedness with a face
amount of $500,000. Under the ruling, Z corporation was required to
reduce its tax attributes by the $200,000 difference between the stock's
redemption price and the face amount of the indebtedness, because that
$200,000 represented cancellation of indebtedness income to Z. If the
same preferred stock had a fair market value of only $100,000 at the time
of issuance, however, Z would have been required under the Act to reduce
its tax attributes by the $400,000 difference between the indebtedness
cancelled in the exchange and the fair market value of the stock at the
time of issuance. Thus, under the Act, Z's preferred stock was treated just
as any other property issued in the exchange. It satisfied indebtedness
only to the extent of its fair market value, even though the stock had a
clear potential to increase in value to its redemption price.
If the stock-for-debt exception were reinstated, an issue arises as to
how preferred stock should be treated under the exception. Should
preferred stock be treated as any other type of stock for purposes of the
exception, so long as it is not nominal or token, as was the case from the
inception of the stock-for-debt exception until three years before its
demise? Conversely, should preferred stock be deemed non-stock for
purposes of the stock-for-debt exception, as the 1990 Act provided? Or,
instead, should the compromise position taken by Revenue Ruling 90-87
be adopted, so that preferred stock qualifies as stock only to the extent of
its redemption price or fair market value at the time of issuance? As
discussed in greater detail in Part V, the position taken in Revenue Ruling
90-87 best comports with the policy justifications underlying the stock-
for-debt exception generally, and should be used as the model for
resolving the preferred stock issue.
B. Use of Parent Company Stock in a Stock-For-Debt Transaction
Prior to the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception in 1993, it was
unclear whether a subsidiary corporation could satisfy its indebtedness
with its parent's stock and still qualify for the stock-for-debt exception." 6
116. Many commentators have debated this issue over the years. See, e.g.,
HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 18, at 112-15; Asofsky, supra note 58, at 609;
Blashek, supra note 103, 102.3; Stefan R. Boshkov, Selected Federal Income Tax
Consequences of Restructuring Debt of Failing Corporations After the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1990, 69 TAXES 214, 224-25 (1991); James D. Bridgeman, Using
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To understand the importance of the parent stock issue, consider the
following scenario, which occurs while the stock-for-debt exception is
still in place. Corporation S is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Corporation
P, and they file consolidated tax returns." 7  S is facing financial
difficulties, and thus files for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. S would like to offer its creditors a combination of stock and cash
in exchange for their indebtedness, using the stock-for-debt exception to
avoid any discharge of indebtedness income or tax attribute reduction. If
S offers the creditors P stock in the exchange, and parent stock does not
qualify for the stock-for-debt exception, S may risk a significant reduction
in its tax attributes as a result of any discharge of indebtedness income
incurred in the exchange.' 18 If, on the other hand, S offers its creditors its
own stock in the exchange, the exchange qualifies for the stock-for-debt
exception but S risks losing its ability to file consolidated returns with its
parent, P.19 Because the Code remained ambiguous on the parent stock
issue until the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception, a corporation was
thus forced to choose between giving up the flexibility of using parent
stock to cancel subsidiary debt or risk incurring substantial discharge of
indebtedness income with a corresponding reduction in its tax
attributes.
12
Some corporations attempted to use a 1959 revenue ruling to argue
that the stock-for-debt exception could be invoked when parent stock was
used to satisfy subsidiary debt. In Revenue Ruling 59-222,21 N, an
unrelated corporation, wanted to gain control of M, a corporation seeking
bankruptcy protection under chapter lI's reorganization provisions. In
the reorganization, M exchanged its stock for N stock, and then issued the
N stock to A's creditors in exchange for their debt. 2 2 Therefore, N's
stock was effectively issued to cancel M's indebtedness.
In its ruling, the Service recharacterized the transaction as a two-step
process, in which M's creditors first constructively exchanged their claims
Parent Stock in the Stock For Debt Exception, 6 PRAC. TAX LAW. 79, 81-94 (1992);
Martin D. Pollack & Stuart J. Goldring, Can Cancellation of Indebtedness Income Be
Avoided With Parent Stock?, CoRP. TAx'N Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 18; Fred T. Witt, Jr. &
William H. Lyons, An Examination of the Tax Consequences of Discharge of
Indebtedness, 10 VA. TAX REv. 1, 50-51 (1990).
117. I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504 (1994).
118. For a discussion of tax attributes reductions, see supra notes 83-85 and
accompanying text.
119. I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504 (1994). If P and S cannot file consolidated tax returns,
S's net operating losses cannot be used to offset P's income. Treas. Reg. § 1. 1502-11 (a)
(as amended in 1999).
120. Of course, if a corporation were financially solvent (and not in bankruptcy)
and parent stock did not qualify for the stock-for-debt exception, the corporation would
recognize discharge of indebtedness income rather than suffering a reduction in its tax
attributes. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
121. Rev. Rul. 59-222, 1959-1 C.B. 80.
122. Id.
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for M stock, invoking protection under the stock-for-debt exception.'23 In
the second part of the recharacterized transaction, M's creditors
constructively exchanged their M stock for N stock, qualifying as a tax-
free reorganization. 2 4  Thus, in Revenue Ruling 59-222 the Service
appeared to condone the use of parent stock under the common law stock-
for-debt exception in effect at the time of the ruling. 125
Nearly ten years after Congress codified the stock-for-debt exception
in 1980, the Service issued a series of three private letter rulings in which
it permitted the exchange of parent stock for subsidiary debt to qualify for
the statutory stock-for-debt exception. 126  In each ruling, the Service
explicitly relied on Revenue Ruling 59-222 in reaching its holding. 12 7
123. Id. at 81 (citing Tower Bldg Corp. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 125 (1946)).
124. In the second step of the recharacterized transaction, N obtained control of M
in exchange for N's voting stock, thus qualifying as a "B" reorganization under I.R.C. §
368(a)(1)(B) (1994). To justify this constructive treatment, the Service reasoned that the
unsecured creditors of a bankrupt or insolvent corporation are, in reality, the equity
holders of the corporation. Accordingly, the overall effect of the deemed transaction is the
same as that of the actual transaction. For a more extensive explanation of why unsecured
creditors should be treated as equity holders in this situation, see the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 183-
84 (1942).
125. For a discussion of the common law stock-for-debt exception in effect in
1959, see supra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
126. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-33-001 (Aug. 22, 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-14-080 (Apr. 7,
1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-52-039 (Dec. 30, 1988). Private Letter Ruling 88-52-039
involved a chapter 11 reorganization in which both the parent and subsidiary corporations
had sought bankruptcy protection. Under the plan of reorganization, the subsidiary issued
its stock to a trustee for the creditors. The trustee then exchanged the subsidiary stock for
parent stock. The Service ruled that the first step of the transaction qualified for the stock-
for-debt exception and the second step qualified as a tax-free B reorganization. I.R.C. §
368(a)(1)(B) (1994).
Private Letter Ruling 89-33-001 involved a chapter I I reorganization of a parent and
four subsidiaries. Under the reorganization plan, parent stock was directly issued to each
subsidiary's creditors. The Service recharacterized the plan as if each creditor had
exchanged its debt for stock of the corresponding subsidiary, after which the creditor
received parent stock in exchange for the newly received subsidiary stock. Because of this
recharacterization, the deemed first step qualified for the stock-for-debt exception and the
second step qualified as a tax-free B reorganization. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-33-001 (Aug. 22,
1989).
Finally, in Private Letter Ruling 89-14-080, the subsidiary was a savings and loan
association that the state regulatory body had put into receivership. Under a plan of
reorganization, the debtor subsidiary transferred all of its assets to another subsidiary of
the parent corporation in exchange for stock of the parent. The debtor subsidiary then
distributed the parent stock to its creditors in satisfaction of its debts. The Service
recharacterized the transaction as a deemed first step that qualified for the stock-for-debt
exception and a second step that qualified as a triangular "G" reorganization. I.R.C. §
368(a)(l)(G) (1994).
127. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-33-001 (Aug. 22, 1989) ("Note that the Service would
decline to recast any part of the transaction [if] all of the parties were not in bankruptcy
and Rev. Rul. 59-222 was not applicable, e.g., if the requirements of section 368(a)(l)(B)
were not satisfied."); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-14-080 (Apr. 7, 1989) ("Target will not recognize
income from the discharge of indebtedness as a result of the constructive exchange of its
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These rulings still left many questions unanswered, however, such as
whether the second step of the transaction had to qualify as a B
reorganization in order to use the stock-for-debt exception, 28 and whether
both the parent and subsidiary corporations were required to have filed for
bankruptcy protection to invoke the exception. 129 Yet despite these
unresolved questions, shortly after the trio of private letter rulings
discussed above was announced, the Service refused to issue any further
rulings on the parent stock issue until it was directly resolved by
regulations. 3 °
During the period in which the Service declined to rule on the parent
stock issue, debtor corporations could avail themselves of two statutory
interpretation arguments to support their contention that parent stock
stock for liabilities discharged in the transaction, to the extent that Target is insolvent at
the time of the transaction (section 108(e)(10), Rev. Rul. 59-222; 1959-1 C.B. 80)."); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 88-52-039 (Dec. 30, 1988) ("The transfer of Target common stock in satisfaction
of the unsecured debt of Target was a transfer described generally in section 108(e)(l 0) of
the Code .... The transfer did not effect a cancellation, reduction, or discharge of
indebtedness of Target and did not require any reduction in Target's tax attributes (Rev.
Rul. 59-222, 1959-1 C.B. 80).").
128. In Private Letter Ruling 89-33-001, the Service limited its ruling by stating
that it would not have recharacterized that transaction if the requirements for a B
reorganization had not been met. On the other hand, there is nothing in Revenue Ruling
59-222 to indicate that a B reorganization is a requirement for recharacterization.
Furthermore, the two private letter rulings issued by the Service just prior to Private Letter
Ruling 89-33-001 do not state that a B reorganization is a requirement for
recharacterization. In fact, the transaction in Private Letter Ruling 89-14-080 qualified as
a G reorganization, not a B reorganization. Finally, Revenue Ruling 59-222 justifies the
deemed first step of the transaction by reasoning that the creditors were actually in control
of the company, so they could be treated as having exchanged their claims for stock of the
debtor. This rationale has nothing to do with a B reorganization. Therefore, reading a B
reorganization requirement into Revenue Ruling 59-222 would be a stretch, and thus one
could logically conclude that a B reorganization is not a prerequisite to recharacterization
under Revenue Ruling 59-222, despite the language of Private Letter Ruling 89-33-001 to
the contrary. See Pollack & Goldring, supra note 116, at 22-23.
129. Private Letter Ruling 89-33-001 states that the 'Service would not have
recharacterized the transaction if the parent and subsidiaries had not been in bankruptcy.
Yet a requirement that the parent corporation be in bankruptcy does not emanate from
Revenue Ruling 59-222, because the facts there involved an unrelated acquiring
corporation rather than a pre-bankruptcy parent. Thus, the ruling was obviously not based
on the fact that the parent was in bankruptcy. Furthermore, Private Letter Ruling 89-14-
080, issued only months before Private Letter Ruling 89-33-001, involved a parent that
was clearly not in bankruptcy. Therefore, the Service's rulings have been inconsistent on
this issue. Moreover, under Revenue Ruling 59-222, the subsidiary might not need to be
in bankruptcy either. Although the facts of the ruling did include a bankrupt subsidiary,
the underlying rationale given by the Service would be equally applicable even if the
subsidiary had only been insolvent. Rev. Rul. 59-222, 1959-1 C.B. 80.
130. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-16-020 (Apr. 17, 1992) ("[T]he Service expresses no
opinion whether parent stock issued to the Sub 1 and Sub 2 creditors satisfies the stock-
for-debt exception."); see also Bridgeman, supra note 116, at 86; Jack S. Levin & Donald
E. Rocap, A Transactional Guide to Federal Tax Aspects of Restructuring Troubled
Corporation Debt, 52 TAX NOTES 1177, 1181 (1991).
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should qualify under the exception.131  First, section 108(e)(7) of the
Code, which addresses a creditor's tax consequences in a stock-for-debt
exchange, specifically provides that stock of the debtor's parent
corporation should be considered stock of the debtor for purposes of that
section.3 2  Before the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception, section
108(e)(10) paralleled section 108(e)(7) by outlining the debtor's tax
consequences in a stock-for-debt exchange.' If parent stock was
considered stock of the debtor for purposes of section 108(e)(7), Congress
likely intended for it to be considered stock of the debtor for purposes of
section 108(e)(10) as well. There is no logical basis for different
treatment of parent stock in these two paragraphs of the same Code
section, which outlined the tax consequences to two parties in the same
exchange.1
4
The second statutory argument that debtor corporations could make
to support the use of parent stock under the stock-for-debt exception
involves the G reorganization rules. 35 In the Bankruptcy Tax Act of
1980, Congress specifically stated that parent stock qualified as
consideration in a triangular G reorganization. 36  This statement
implicitly recognizes that parent stock qualifies for the stock-for-debt
exception because, without the exception, reorganizations would be
nearly impossible due to large amounts of discharge of indebtedness
income.13
7
Debtor corporations that attempted to rely on these statutory
arguments, however, had to overcome two obstacles. First, the House
version of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, which limited the stock-for-
debt exception to certain types of debt, 3 8 explicitly authorized the use of
131. These arguments, of course, were equally available to debtor corporations
before the Service issued its no-ruling position. Because the monetary stakes were quite
high, however, most debtors sought a ruling from the Service on the parent stock issue
rather than taking a risk that their statutory arguments would not be upheld by a court.
132. I.R.C. § 108(e)(7)(C) (1994).
133. I.R.C. § 108(e)(10) (repealed 1993).
134. But see Bridgeman, supra note 116, at 84-85 (arguing that statutory
construction requires section 108(e)(7) to operate independently of section 108(e)(10)).
Moreover, section 108(e)(7) is phrased "for purposes of this paragraph." This has led
other commentators to argue that Congress would have used the phrase "for purposes of
this section" if it had intended that section 108(e)(7)(C) apply equally to the stock-for-debt
exception in section 108(e)(10). Pollack & Goldring, supra note 116, at 20 n.14. On the
other hand, these authors acknowledge that the discrepancy may have merely been a
drafting error. Id.
135. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(G) (1994).
136. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (1994).
137. Henderson & Goldring, supra note 18, at 112; see also Pollack & Goldring,
supra note 116, at 20.
138. H.R. 5043, 96th Cong. § 2(a) (1979); see also SUBCOMM. ON SELECT
REVENUE MEASURES OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
H.R. 5043 (BANKRUPTCY TAX ACT OF 1979) 5-6 (Joint Comm. Print 1979).
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parent stock under the exception. 3 9 Unfortunately, the Senate deleted the
House provision concerning the stock-for-debt exception and replaced it
with what would become section 108(e)(8). 40  Therefore, the language
concerning parent stock made it into section 108(e)(7), but not into the
stock-for-debt exception. Accordingly, the Service could argue that the
Senate considered and rejected the House's statement permitting parent
stock to be used under the stock-for-debt exception.'
4
'
Second, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, which
provided that "disqualified stock" would not qualify for the stock-for-debt
exception, 42 also added the phrase "stock of the debtor" to section
108(e)(10)(B) of the Code, the section which states that the stock-for-debt
exception applies only to bankrupt and insolvent debtors.' 43 A literal
reading of this phrase would suggest that Congress intended by these
1990 amendments to preclude the use of parent stock under the exception.
There is, however, no indication in the Act's legislative history that this
was the intent of Congress. 44 Thus, the Code remained unclear on the
parent stock issue until the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception in 1993.
The Service issued its most recent pronouncement on the parent
stock issue two years after the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception in
1993.141 In Private Letter Ruling 95-16-025,146 a parent corporation and
several of its subsidiaries filed separate petitions for reorganization under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The reorganization plans provided
that secured creditors, subordinated debenture holders, and unsecured
claimants of the subsidiaries would receive a combination of cash, debt,
stock warrants, and common stock of the parent corporation in exchange
for their claims. The Service ruled that the exchange of parent stock for
subsidiary debt would qualify for the stock-for-debt exception.
139. Id.; see also The Bankruptcy Tax Act and Minor Tax Bills: Hearing on H.R.
5043 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 96th Cong. 22-24 (1979).
140. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,
7032.
141. See, e.g., Pollack & Goldring, supra note 116, at 20.
142. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text for discussion of disqualified
stock.
143. I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(B) (repealed 1993), provided that:
(B) Exception for certain stock in title I c ases and insolvent debtors-
(i) In general. Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any transfer of stock
of the debtor (other than disqualified stock)-
(I) by a debtor in a title 1I case, or
(II) by any other debtor but only to the extent such debtor is
insolvent.
Id. (emphasis added).
144. HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 18, at 114-15.
145. The Service had occasion to rule on the parent stock issue because the
corporation requesting the ruling fell within the repeal's transition rules, and was thus able
to avail itself of the stock-for-debt exception. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-16-025 (Apr. 21, 1995).
146. Id.
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Moreover, it stated that the exchange would not result in any subsidiary
losing its ability to file consolidated tax returns with its parent group.
4 1
Although this ruling appears to indicate that the Service would adopt
a more pro-taxpayer approach on the parent stock issue if the stock-for-
debt exception were reinstated, as this Article suggests, courts have never
had occasion to rule on the issue. 148 Moreover, the Service's most recent
position is in a private letter ruling, which cannot be used or cited by
another taxpayer as precedent. 49 Thus, if Congress adopts the position
taken in this Article and reinstates the stock-for-debt exception, it must
also resolve the parent stock issue. Part V of this Article argues that
parent stock should be treated as subsidiary stock for purposes of the
stock-for-debt exception to afford subsidiary corporations in financial
difficulty more flexibility to negotiate successful reorganizations.
C. The Stock-for-Debt Exception's De Minimis Limitation
When Congress codified the stock-for-debt exception as part of the
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, it enacted a two-part de minimis limitation
in order to curtail corporations' abuse of the exception. 50 This provision,
contained in section 108(e)(8) of the Code before its repeal in 1993, stated
that the stock-for-debt exception would not apply in two instances: (1) to
the "issuance of nominal or token shares,"' 5' or (2) with respect to
unsecured creditors, to the disproportional distribution of shares.152 Each
of these concepts will be explored in greater detail below.
1. THE ISSUANCE OF NOMINAL OR TOKEN SHARES
Although the Code did not define what constituted nominal or token
stock, and there was no reported judicial interpretation of this phrase, the
legislative history of section 108 did provide some meager guidance.
Both the Senate and House reports to the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980
provided that a facts and circumstances test should be applied to
determine whether a debtor corporation was attempting to circumvent the
recognition of cancellation of indebtedness income or tax attribute
147. Id. The ruling also provided that stock of the parent corporation issued to
creditors in the exchange should be considered stock of each subsidiary for purposes of
determining whether such stock was nominal or token under section 108(e)(8) of the Code
(prior to its repeal in 1993). For a more complete discussion of the nominal or token stock
issue, see infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
148. HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 18, at 112.
149. I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1994).
150. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2, 94 Stat. 3389, 3394
(1980) (codified at I.R.C. § 108(e)(8)(A) (repealed 1993)).
151. I.R.C. § 108(e)(8)(A) (repealed 1993).
152. I.R.C. § 108(e)(8)(B) (repealed 1993).
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reduction by issuing a nominal amount of stock to a creditor who has no
real equity interest in the corporation.'53
It was not until eight years after Congress passed the 1980 Act that
the Service first attempted to interpret the nominal or token limitation in
Technical Advice Memorandum 88-37-001.54 The memorandum
involved a debtor corporation in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding that
issued cash and voting preferred stock to certain of its unsecured creditors
in exchange for their debt. The Service, relying on a facts and
circumstances determination as suggested by the legislative history of
section 108, ruled that the preferred stock was not nominal or token
within the meaning of section 108(e)(8)(A) based on a number of factors.
First, the stock issued was worth approximately ten percent of the debt
cancelled (after reducing the indebtedness by cash paid in the exchange).
Second, the stock comprised fifteen percent of the total consideration
received by the unsecured creditors and represented slightly over three
percent of the corporation's total voting power. Finally, the Service
found that sufficiently adverse economic interests existed between the
debtor corporation and the unsecured creditors.'
After an initial ill-fated attempt to clarify the nominal or token
limitation in 1990 through regulations met with sharp criticism by tax
commentators, 156 the Service issued proposed regulations on the nominal
153. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017,
7032; H.R. REP. No. 96-833, at 14 (1980).
154. Tech. Adv. Mem. 88-37-001 (May 10, 1988).
155. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of Technical Advice Memorandum 88-37-
001, see supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text; see also David J. Shakow, The Stock-
for-Debt De Minimis Exception, 41 TAx NOTES 1325 (1988). Beginning in 1990, the
Service refused to rule on whether shares issued in a stock-for-debt exchange were
nominal or token when both preferred and common stock were received by unsecured
creditors in the transaction. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-19-036 (Feb. 9, 1990); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 90-12-039 (Dec. 22, 1989).
156. On December 7, 1990, the service issued the first set of proposed regulations
on the nominal or token limitation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1, 55 Fed. Reg. 50568 (Dec.
7, 1990) (as amended by T.D. 8532, 1994-17 I.R.B. 5). The proposed regulations clarified
that disqualified stock, see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text, would not be
considered stock for purposes of section 108(e)(8). They then set forth a nonexclusive set
of factors to be considered in determining whether stock issued to creditors in a stock-for-
debt transaction was nominal or token, including (1) the stock-to-debt ratio (which
compared the fair market value of the stock transferred to a creditor with the amount of
discharged debt allocable to that stock); (2) the stock-to-total-consideration ratio (which
compared the fair market value of the stock transferred to a creditor to the fair market
value of total consideration received by that creditor); and (3) the stock-to-total-stock ratio
(which compared the fair market value of the stock transferred to all creditors to the total
fair market value of all outstanding stock of the corporation after the bankruptcy
reorganization or insolvency workout). Id. The proposed regulations provided that a low
ratio in any of these three categories was evidence that the stock issued to creditors was
nominal or token.
The regulations also provided special rules regarding the treatment of preferred
stock that was not considered disqualified stock. Under those rules, the debt allocated to
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or token issue on November 4, 1992.157 These proposed regulations
provided that all relevant facts and circumstances should be considered in
making the determination whether stock issued in a stock-for-debt
exchange was nominal or token. In addition, they stated that this
determination should be made separately with respect to common and
preferred stock.'58 Finally, the proposed regulations provided that the
nominal or token determination be made on an aggregate basis with
respect to all common stock issued for unsecured debt, with a separate
determination being made with respect to preferred stock issued for
each class of preferred stock in the exchange was to be equal to the lesser of the lowest
redemption price or the lowest liquidation preference of the preferred stock for any period
after its issuance. The allocated debt, however, was not to be less than the fair market
value of the preferred stock nor greater than the total amount of debt to be discharged.
The regulation defined preferred stock as that stock with a limited or fixed redemption
price or liquidation preference that did not materially participate in the growth of the
corporation. The regulation expressly stated that meaningful participation was not
established by a right to convert the stock into stock other than preferred stock, or the fact
that the redemption price or liquidation preference exceeded the fair market value of the
preferred stock. Id.
These proposed regulations were roundly criticized by tax commentators. See, e.g.,
HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 18, at 120-22 (referring to the December 7, 1990
issuance of the proposed regulations as "Pearl Harbor Day for the stock-for-debt
exception," and stating that the proposed regulations "turned the de minimis test on its
head. They seemed to convert a negative test that the stock issued not be nominal, token,
or de minimis into a positive requirement that it be large, substantial, and significant");
Ross S. Friedman & P. Anthony Nissley, Revised Stock-for-Debt Rules Take More
Favorable Approaches to "Nominal or Token" Tests, 78 J. TAx'N 276, 276 (1993)
(applauding the 1992 proposed regulations as a vast improvement over the 1990 proposed
regulations, which "placed a heavy emphasis on FMV in determining whether the nominal
or token shares rule applies"); see also American Bar Association Section of Taxation,
Comments Concerning Proposed Standards for Determining Whether Shares Are
"Nominal or Token" Under Section 108(e)(8)(A), 50 TAx NOTES 995, 995 (1991) ("The
proposed standards should be reconsidered. They deviate substantially from any prior
interpretations given to words such as 'nominal' or 'token' in the tax law and are
unsupported by evidence of congressional intent in the legislative history or by any
general understanding of the meaning of those or similar words.").
157. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1, 57 Fed. Reg. 52601 (Nov. 4, 1992) (as amended
by T.D. 8532, 1994-17 I.R.B. 5); see also I.R.S. Announcement 92-174, 1992-50 I.R.B. 47
(providing a notice of public hearing on the proposed de minimis regulations). As part of
these proposed regulations, the Service withdrew its regulations proposed in 1990.
158. According to the regulations, "[w]ithout separate testing of preferred stock
and common stock under section 108(e)(8), the debtor could avoid this limitation merely
by issuing a de minimis amount of common stock, in addition to the preferred stock, for
the indebtedness." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1, 57 Fed. Reg. 52601 (Nov. 4, 1992) (as
amended by T.D. 8532, 1994-17 I.R.B. 5). For purposes of the regulations, preferred
stock was defined as any stock with a limited redemption price or liquidation preference,
other than disqualified stock, that had no right to participate in corporate growth to a
meaningful extent at the time of its issuance. Id. The regulations then defined common
stock as all stock other than disqualified or preferred stock. Id. For a discussion of the
term "disqualified stock," see supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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unsecured debt.'59  On March 17, 1994, the Service issued final
regulations on the nominal or token limitation, 160 which adopted the 1992
proposed regulations with only minor changes.
On the same day that it promulgated final regulations on the nominal
or token issue, the Service also released a revenue procedure providing a
safe harbor for establishing that common stock issued in a stock-for-debt
transaction would not be considered nominal or token under section
108(e)(8)(A) of the Code. 161 Under the safe harbor, common stock issued
in a title 11 bankruptcy case or an insolvency workout would not be
considered nominal or token if the "stock-to-total-stock ratio" were at
least fifteen percent.
162
2. THE DISPROPORTIONALITY LIMITATION
The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, which enacted the nominal or
token limitation, also added a disproportionality limitation to the stock-
for-debt exception. 63  This limitation applied only to creditors holding
unsecured claims, and provided that the stock-for-debt exception would
not apply with respect to any given unsecured creditor if the ratio of the
value of the stock received by the creditor to the amount of the creditor's
unsecured debt to be cancelled or exchanged for stock was less than fifty
percent of a similar ratio computed for all unsecured creditors
participating in the workout.' 64
When the Service promulgated proposed regulations in 1990
addressing the nominal or token limitation, it failed to provide any
guidance on the disproportionality limitation. 165  Upon reissuing these
159. This aggregate approach to the nominal or token determination is a
significant departure from the Service's position in the 1990 proposed regulations, which
took a creditor-by-creditor approach to the determination.
160. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1 (1994).
161. Rev. Proc. 94-26, 1994-1 C.B. 612-13.
162. Id. The stock-to-total-stock ratio is defined as "the ratio of (i) the value of
common stock issued for unsecured indebtedness in the title I I case or insolvency
workout to (ii) the value of all stock of the corporation outstanding after the title I 1 case
or insolvency workout (including preferred stock and disqualified stock)." Id. The
effective date of the revenue procedure is generally May 17, 1994. Id.
163. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2, 94 Stat. 3389, 3390
(1980) (codified at I.R.C. § 108(e)(8)(B) (repealed 1993)).
164. I.R.C. § 108(e)(8)(B) (repealed 1993). The legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 defined the term workout to include a title I I bankruptcy
case, a receivership, foreclosure, or similar proceeding, either in federal or state court, or
any other transaction in which the indebtedness of the corporation is restructured in an
effort to relieve its financial difficulties. S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 17 n.20 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7032.
165. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1, 55 Fed. Reg. 50568 (Dec. 7, 1990) (as amended
by T. D. 8532, 1994-17 I.R.B. 5). The Service did, however, provide some limited
guidance on the disproportionality limitation in 1991 when it issued Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-05-
042 (Feb. 27, 1990). In that ruling, the Service addressed a number of issues, such as how
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proposed regulations in 1992, however, the Service finally addressed the
disproportionality limitation in some detail. 166  Specifically, the
regulations provided that the disproportionality test of section
108(e)(8)(B) was to be applied separately with respect to common and
preferred stock issued in the exchange on an indebtedness-by-
indebtedness basis. 67 Under this test, the stock-for-debt exception would
not apply to unsecured debt discharged for stock in a title 11 case or an
insolvency workout if the "individual stock ratio" did not equal at least
one-half of the "group stock ratio. With respect to common stock, the
individual stock ratio was defined in the regulations as the value of
common stock issued for a specific unsecured debt divided by the amount
of unsecured debt allocated to that common stock.169 Similarly, the group
stock ratio for common stock was defined as the aggregate value of all
common stock issued for unsecured indebtedness over the aggregate
amount of unsecured indebtedness allocated to all common stock.170 If
the individual common stock ratio was less than one-half of the group
common stock ratio, then the indebtedness being evaluated would not
qualify for the stock-for-debt exception. 171 Like common stock, preferred
purposes of applying the disproportionality test. For a more complete discussion of this
ruling, see HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 18, at 126-28.
166. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1, 57 Fed. Reg. 52601 (Nov. 4, 1992) (as amended
by T.D. 8532, 1994-17 I.R.B. 5).
167. The regulations provide that an indebtedness-by-indebtedness approach is
used rather than a creditor-by-creditor approach so as to simplify the application of the
disproportionality limitation by not requiring the debtor corporation to identify each
creditor holding indebtedness. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1, 57 Fed. Reg. 52601 (Nov. 4,
1992) (as amended by T. D. 8532, 1994-17 I.R.B. 5).
168. Id.
169. Under the regulations, the amount of unsecured debt allocated to the
common stock equaled the adjusted issue price of the indebtedness for which the common
stock was issued, less other consideration transferred in exchange for the indebtedness. Id.
For purposes of this calculation, consideration was defined to include money, the issue
price of the new indebtedness, the amount of indebtedness allocated to preferred stock
under the regulation, and the value of other property, including any disqualified stock. Id.
170. Id. For purposes of this calculation, the amount of unsecured indebtedness
allocated to all common stock was equal to the adjusted issue price of all unsecured
indebtedness exchanged for stock or cancelled in the bankruptcy proceeding or insolvency
workout, less other consideration transferred in exchange for indebtedness. Id. The
definition of consideration for purposes of the group common stock ratio was the same as
the definition of consideration for the individual common stock ratio. Id.
171. The following example serves to illustrate the application of the
proportionality test under the regulations:
(A) X Corporation has three outstanding debts, each is an unsecured
indebtedness of X with a $100,000 adjusted issue price. In a title Il case, the
first indebtedness is exchanged for $50,000 cash and $20,000 of common
stock, the second indebtedness is exchanged for $10,000 cash, and the third
indebtedness is exchanged for $5,000 common stock. The individual common
stock ratio for the first indebtedness is 40 percent, which is determined by
comparing the value of the common stock issued for the indebtedness
($20,000) to the amount of unsecured indebtedness allocated to that stock
1034
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stock was separately tested for disproportionality using similar ratios.
Under the regulations, the individual preferred stock ratio was defined as
the value of the preferred stock issued in exchange for an unsecured debt
over the amount of unsecured indebtedness allocated to the preferred
stock. 72 The group preferred stock ratio was similarly defined in the
regulations as the aggregate value of all preferred stock issued for
unsecured indebtedness over the aggregate amount of unsecured
indebtedness allocated to the preferred stock.173  If the individual
preferred stock ratio with respect to an unsecured indebtedness was not
equal to at least one-half of the group preferred stock ratio, then, under
the disproportionality test, the stock-for-debt exception would not apply
with respect to that indebtedness.17 4
($100,000 adjusted issue price less $50,000 cash received). The individual
common stock ratio for the second indebtedness is 0 percent because no stock
is received in exchange for the indebtedness. The individual common stock
ratio for the third indebtedness is 5 percent, which is determined by comparing
the value of the common stock issued for the indebtedness ($5,000) to the
amount of unsecured indebtedness allocated to that stock ($100,000).
(B) The group common stock ratio is 10.4 percent, which is determined by
comparing the value of all of the common stock issued for unsecured
indebtedness in the title 11 case ($25,000) to the amount of unsecured
indebtedness allocated to the stock ($300,000 aggregate adjusted issue price of
all indebtedness exchanged for stock or cancelled in the title II case less
$60,000 cash received). Accordingly, section 108(e)(8)(B) is satisfied only
with respect to the common stock issued for the first indebtedness. The stock-
for-debt exception does not apply to the second or third indebtedness.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1, 57 Fed. Reg. 52601 (Nov. 4, 1992) (as amended by T. D.
8532, 1994-17 I.R.B. 5).
172. Id. The amount of unsecured debt allocated to the preferred stock was
defined in the regulations as equal to the lesser of the stock's lowest redemption price or
its lowest liquidation preference, determined at the time of issuance. Id. This amount,
however, could not be less than the fair market value of the preferred stock nor greater
than the adjusted issue price of the unsecured indebtedness. Id.
173. Just as with the individual preferred stock ratio, the aggregate amount of
unsecured indebtedness allocated to the preferred stock was defined in the regulations as
the lowest redemption price for all preferred stock or such stock's lowest liquidation
preference, again determined at the time of issuance. Id.
174. Two additional points deserve clarification at this juncture. First,
disqualified stock, defined supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text, does not qualify as
stock for purposes of the stock-for-debt exception; therefore, it is treated merely as other
consideration issued in exchange for indebtedness and does not otherwise enter into the
common or preferred stock ratios. Id. Second, the regulations specifically address the
issue of undersecured indebtedness. The regulations provide that undersecured debt is to
be considered two separate debts: (1) a secured indebtedness with an adjusted issue price
equal to the value of the property securing that indebtedness; and (2) an unsecured
indebtedness with an adjusted issue price equal to the remainder of the debt. Id.
Accordingly, the undersecured portion of a secured indebtedness will be included in the
common or preferred stock ratios outlined above.
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These proposed regulations were finalized in 1994 with only minor
changes.175 A critical issue that the Service failed to address in the final
regulations, however, and for which the disproportionality limitation has
been roundly criticized, is that the limitation does not take into account
that unsecured creditors often have differing levels of contractual
priority. 176 In fact, two noted tax scholars have taken their criticisms one
step further, suggesting that the disproportionality limitation "simply does
not make a lot of sense.' 7 Part V of this Article will address whether the
nominal or token limitation and the disproportionality test should be
retained if the stock-for-debt exception is reinstated, as the Article
suggests.
IV. REPEAL OF THE STOCK-FOR-DEBT EXCEPTION AS PART OF
THE OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993
Although a number of limitations were placed on the availability of
the stock-for-debt exception following its statutory codification in
1980,178 Congress did not attempt to repeal the exception until 1992.171
The suggestion for repeal arose in a most unusual way. On July 23, 1992,
Representative Guy Vander Jagt, a member of the House Ways and
Means Committee, introduced in Congress House Bill 5674,'80 dealing
with the tax treatment of certain cargo containers.181 The primary purpose
of the bill was to extend a number of favorable tax benefits to intermodal
175. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-1 (as amended by T.D. 8532, 1994-1 C.B. 21). The
Service incorporated into the final regulations commentators' suggestions that (I) the final
regulations should clarify that, for purposes of the disproportionality test, the adjusted
issue price of stock should include any indebtedness that is discharged in the title I I case
or insolvency workout, including accrued but unpaid stated interest; and (2) in
determining whether certain stock is preferred stock for purposes of the disproportionality
regulations, "preferred stock that is convertible into common stock should be considered
participating stock if the conversion right represents, in substance, a meaningful right to
participate in corporate growth." T. D. 8532, 1994-1 C.B. 22.
176. Blashek, supra note 103, at 1-18.
177. HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 18, at 128 (suggesting that "[tihe
regulation seems the best one can do with an imperfectly conceived statute").
178. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2, 94 Stat.
3389, 3394 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 108(e)(8) (repealed 1993)) (adopting a de
minimis limitation to the stock-for-debt exception); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, § 59, 98 Stat. 494, 576-77 (1984) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §
108(e)(10) (prior to 1993 amendment)) (limiting the applicability of the stock-for-debt
exception to cases of bankrupt or insolvent taxpayers); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11325, 104 Stat. 1388, 1466 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(B) (repealed 1993)) (limiting the use of the stock-for-debt exception in
the case of certain types of preferred stock). For a complete discussion of these
limitations, see supra notes 97-177 and accompanying text.
179. H.R. 5674, 102d Cong. § 203 (1992).
180. 138 CONG. REc. E2227 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (statement of Rep. Vander
Jagt).
181. H.R. 5674, 102d Cong., Title 1 (1992).
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cargo containers." 2 In order to finance the tax benefits being proposed,
the bill sought to repeal the stock-for-debt exception.18 3  As
Representative McGrath explained, "[t]o raise offsetting revenue for these
changes, the bill would repeal the rule that gives special treatment to
exchanges of stock for debt in bankrupt and insolvent corporations.
'' 84
At the time of the introduction of House Bill 5674 in July of 1992, the
repeal of the stock-for-debt exception was predicted to increase revenues
by $286 million over a five-year period.'85
As part of a political compromise, House Bill 5674 became part of a
larger bill being considered by the House, the Revenue Act of 1992.186
As part of the same political bargain, no hearings were held on the bill,
nor was there any debate by the House Ways and Means Committee.187
The Revenue Act of 1992 passed the House of Representatives on July 2,
1992,188 and was referred to the Senate Finance Committee on July 21,
1992 for consideration. 8 9 Although the Committee initially refused to
vote favorably on the Vander Jagt proposal, the Senate conferees
eventually accepted the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception in exchange
182. H.R. 5674, 102d Cong. §§ 101-04 (1992); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-735, at
1-3 (1992); 138 CONG. REc. H7162 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1992) (statement of Rep. Matsui).
183. H.R. REP. No. 102-735, at 6-7 (1992).
184. 138 CONG. REc. H7162 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1992) (statement of Rep.
McGrath). It should be noted that the bill's sponsor, Representative Vander Jagt, did not
admit that the primary purpose of the exception's repeal was to finance the favorable tax
benefits provided to intermodal cargo containers. Instead, he said that the stock-for-debt
exception was not
grounded in sound tax policy .... [B]y using the stock-for-debt exception, an
eligible corporation can retire its debts while preserving its net operating
losses as a tax shelter to use against future income-an advantage not
available to other taxpayers. That result goes beyond what is necessary to
give bankrupt and insolvent corporations a fresh start, and is plainly unfair to
other taxpayers not eligible to use the special rule. Therefore, the stock-for-
debt exception should be repealed.
138 CONG. REc. E2228 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (statement of Rep. Vander Jagt); see also
H.R. REP. No. 102-735, at 6 (1992) ("The exception is a significant source of unnecessary
transactional complexity and may encourage the structuring of transactions which are
motivated principally by tax planning considerations.").
185. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT TO H.R. I I (REVENUE ACT OF 1992) 3 (Joint Comm. Print
1992); Kathleen M. Berry, Taxes, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, July 6, 1993, at I; see also
Craig W. Friedrich, The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993: Repeal of Stock-for-Debt
Exception to Cancellation-of-Indebtedness Income, 21 J. CORP. TAX'N 92, 95 (1994).
186. H.R. 11, 102d Cong. (1992). Section 3013 of the Revenue Act of 1992, the
provision repealing the stock-for-debt exception, was added to House Bill I I by H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 102-1034, at 180-81 (1992).
187. Grant Newton & Paul Wertheim, Examining the Impact From the Repeal of
the Stock-for-Debt Exception, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 355, 355, 363 (1995); see also
Asofsky, supra note 23, at 13-32.
188. 138 CONG. REC. H5966 (daily ed. July 2, 1992).
189. 138 CONG. REC. S10034 (daily ed. July 21, 1992).
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for their own special, interest provisions.1 90 When House Bill 11 went to
President Bush for his signature, he vetoed the legislation for reasons
unrelated to the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception. 191
Although one critic had already referred to the proposed repeal of the
stock-for-debt exception as "a rancid piece of political pork" that would
"occupy a special place in the hall of shame,"' 92 the push to repeal the
exception was renewed less than a year later as part of Senate Bill 1134,
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.193 Like its 1992
predecessor, the bill repealed the stock-for-debt exception in its entirety,
forcing any debtor corporation, whether in bankruptcy or insolvent, to
treat the transfer of its stock in satisfaction of its indebtedness as if it had
transferred money equal to the fair market value of the stock so
transferred. 194 Unlike the 1992 proposal, however, the Senate Bill allowed
a corporation in bankruptcy or an insolvent corporation to reduce its tax
attributes by the amount of its discharge-of-indebtedness income rather
than including it in gross income in the year of the discharge.' 95
Because the House and Senate were unable to concur with respect to
certain aspects of the budget reconciliation bill, the bill was sent to
conference committee on July 14, 1993.196 On August 4, 1993, the
190. 138 CONG. REC. S17707 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992); see also Asofsky, supra
note 23, at 13-32.
191. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Revenue Act of 1992, 2 PUB. PAPERS
2154 (Nov. 4, 1992). President Bush pocket vetoed House Bill 11 on November 5, 1992.
Status of House Bills, [1991-1992], 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 35,001, 35,003 (Nov. 5,
1992); see also Asofsky, supra note 23, at 13-32 to 13-33.
192. Asofsky, supra note 23, at 13-32 to 13-33.
193. S. 1134, 103d Cong. § 8226(a) (1993).
194. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-213, at 620 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1309. Procedurally, the bill first repealed section 108(e)(8)
(providing generally that the stock-for-debt exception did not apply to the issuance of
nominal or token shares) and section 108(e)(1 0) (providing that only insolvent debtors and
those in bankruptcy could avail themselves of the exception and that disqualified stock
could not be used to invoke protection under the exception). It then replaced section
108(e)(8) with a new provision, which stated:
(8) Indebtedness satisfied by corporation's stock.
For purposes of determining income of a debtor from discharge of
indebtedness, if a debtor corporation transfers stock to a creditor in
satisfaction of its indebtedness, such corporation shall be treated as having
satisfied the indebtedness with an amount of money equal to the fair market
value of the stock.
S. 1134, 103d Cong. § 8226(a) (1993); see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13226(a)(1), 107 Stat. 312, 487 (1993).
195. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., COMPARISON OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2264 (OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993) As
PASSED BY THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE 40 (Joint Comm. Print 1993); see also Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13226(a)(1), 107 Stat. 312, 487
(1993); S. 1134, 103d Cong. § 8226(b) (1993); 139 CONG. REC. S8037 (daily ed. June 24,
1993).
196. Senate Bill 1134 was first introduced on June 22, 1993. After amendments
to the bill had been adopted by voice vote in the Senate on June 24, 1993, the bill was
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conference committee released its report, which, indicated that the
Senate's proposal to repeal the stock-for-debt exception was accepted by
the committee' 97 without any hearings ever being held regarding the
exception's repeal.' 9 The Conference Committee Report was adopted by
the House and Senate on August 5 and 6, 1993, respectively, and the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was signed by the President
on August 10, 1993.199
The Senate Finance Committee's report provided the following
reasons for the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception:
The committee believes that the present-law stock-for-debt
exception distorts the proper measurement of economic income.
In addition, because the stock-for-debt exception results in the
forgiveness of tax related to COD income without a
corresponding reduction in tax attributes, a corporation
emerging from bankruptcy may enjoy a significant tax
advantage not enjoyed by either a comparable solvent firm that
restructures its debt outside bankruptcy or a start-up company.
Finally, the ancillary rules surrounding the eligibility for, and
the mechanics of, the stock-for-debt exception are complex and
cumbersome.oo
Yet despite the fact that the committee reports failed -to acknowledge that
one of the principal purposes of the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception
was to raise revenue to support other tax reduction measures, within the
indefinitely postponed and the Senate passed House Bill 2264 in lieu of Senate Bill 134
on the same day (amending H.R. 2264, 103d Cong. § 8226 (1993), to contain Senate Bill
1134). Status of Senate Bills [1993-1994] 1 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 21,001, 21,023 (Dec.
9, 1994). Because the Senate had amended House Bill 2264 before passing it, the versions
of the bill passed by the two houses of Congress differed dramatically. Accordingly, the
Senate requested a conference, and the House acceded to the Senate's request. Thus,
House Bill 2264 was sent to a conference committee on July 14, 1993. Status of House
Bills [1993-1994] 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 35,001, 35,034 (Dec. 9, 1994).
197. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, at 620 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1309; see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG.,
OVERVIEW OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993 (H.R. 2264) 18 (Joint Comm. Print
1993).
198. HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 18, at 105; see also Friedrich, supra
note 185, at 95; Williams, supra note 38, at 170.
199. Status of House Bills, [1993-1994], 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 35,001,
35,034 (Dec. 9, 1994); see also Remarks on Signing the Omnibus Budget Reconcilation
Act of 1993, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1355 (Aug. 10, 1993).
200. THE RIA COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE REVENUE RECONCILATION ACT OF
1993 WITH CODE SECTIONS AS AMENDED AND COMMITTEE REPORTS 736 (1993).
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Act it is clear that this is the case because the repeal is located in the
revenue raising provisions of the Conference Report.201
One of the most disconcerting aspects of the exception's repeal was
the estimate of the revenue to be derived from it. Recall that when
Representative Vander Jagt attempted to repeal the stock-for-debt
exception in 1992, the estimate of the revenue to be derived from the
repeal was $286 million.20 2 When the exception was repealed in 1993,
however, it was estimated to raise over $622 million in revenue.20 3 Thus,
the estimated revenue to be raised by the repeal had increased by 218% in
less than one year, which, as one critic stated, illustrates "the Wizard of
Oz character of all our Congressional revenue estimates. 20 4
The effective date of the exception's repeal illustrates yet another
bizarre procedural action taken by the conference committee on this issue.
Although the Senate had proposed that the repeal should apply to stock
transfers occurring after June 17, 1993,205 the conference committee
amended the provision's effective date significantly, so that the repeal
applies to stock transferred after December 31, 1994.206 Commentators
have opined that the repeal's prospective effective date suggests that the
committee was very reluctant to repeal the exception at all.207
201. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-213, at 517, 619 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1206, 1308; see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 418 (1993); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
103D CONG., SUMMARY OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS BUDGET
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993 (H.R. 2264) V, 18 (Joint Comm. Print 1993); Wayne I.
Danson & David R. Kuney, Preserving Tax Attributes in Bankruptcy, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
21, 1994, at 30 ("Members of the congressional staff who worked on this measure indicate
that little analysis was done on the effect that the repeal would have on corporate
reorganizations and that the legislation was seen as a pure revenue issue.").
202. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
203. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF
THE REVENUE RECONCILIATION PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2264, AS PASSED BY THE SENATE ON
JUNE 25, 1993 2 (Joint Comm. Print 1993); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG.,
ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE RECONCILIATION PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2264
AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE AND SENATE 6 (Joint Comm. Print 1993); see also CHH Tax
Advisory Board Roundtable, Planning Opportunities and Pitfalls Under the 1993 Tax
Act-An Early View, 71 TAXES 523, 542 (1993) (statement of Gordon Henderson)
[hereinafter CHH Roundtable].
204. CHH Roundtable, supra note 203, at 542; see also Philip S. Corwin,
Comment: Pending Proposals to Gut Chapter II Would Be Disastrous for the Economy,
THE AM. BANKER, Oct. 7, 1993, at 19.
205. S. 1134, 103d Cong. § 8226(a)(3) (1993).
206. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §
13226(a)(3), 107 Stat. 312, 487-88 (1993). The effective date also contained an important
exception: the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception does not apply to transfers of stock in
satisfaction of indebtedness made in a title 11 or similar case if the case was filed on or
before December 31, 1993. Id. § 13226(a)(3)(B).
207. Friedrich, supra note 185, at 95 ("In effect, taxpayers are given over four
months to file in bankruptcy and avoid the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception. Given
the well-known proclivity of Congress to backdate legislation, this lead time is especially
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V. REINSTATING THE STOCK-FOR-DEBT EXCEPTION IN
CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
The repeal of the stock-for-debt exception in 1993 can be attacked on
both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, the repeal was
undertaken without any congressional hearings on its economic and
policy consequences.2 8 It is clear that the sole purpose behind the repeal
was to raise revenue to offset specifically targeted tax benefits. 0 9
Moreover, the estimates of revenue to be derived from the repeal of the
exception were highly suspect, having risen in less than six months from
$286 million over five years to $622 million over the same time period.21 0
Finally, the repeal's delayed effective date was quite irregular. 1
Substantively, bankruptcy experts have predicted that the repeal will
encourage insolvent and bankrupt corporations to issue debt rather than
stock to their creditors, thereby decreasing the value of the reorganized
company. Moreover, commentators have argued that lenders will seek
liquidation, rather than reorganization, of financially troubled
corporations,21 a thereby defeating the bankruptcy policy of rehabilitating
rather than liquidating such corporations.21 4  These procedural and
substantive concerns suggest that the repeal of the stock-for-debt
exception might have been hasty political maneuvering rather than a
considered change in bankruptcy and tax policy.
21 5
generous. I wonder if it does not reflect recognition somewhere that this legislation is ill-
considered and disruptive.") (footnotes omitted).
208. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Cancellation of
Indebtedness-Stock-for-Debt Exception, 59 TAx NOTES 573, 573-74 (1993); see also
supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
209. For a more in-depth discussion of the revenue-raising aspect of the repeal,
see supra notes 184-85, 201 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., 6 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW &
PRACTICE 2D § 127:13 (1994) ("In reality, the savings over the next five years are very
small, if any. Using the Chapter 11 reorganization plans that were confirmed in 1991 as
representative of the tax savings that the government would receive, the actual savings
would be less than one third of the $622 million estimate."); see also supra notes 202-04
and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Robert F. Reilly, Impact of the 1993 Tax Act on Bankruptcy and
Valuation Analysis, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 10, 19 (1994); see also infra notes 229-31
and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Reed W. Easton, Repeal of Stock-for-Debt Exception Discourages
Fresh Starts, 22 TAx'N FOR LAW. 229, 234 (1994); James Gadsden & Christopher H.
Smith, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 112 BANKING L.J. 212, 226 (1995); see also
infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
215. Several bankruptcy taxation scholars have criticized the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, which repealed the stock-for-debt exception, as an example of
how tax legislation has changed from a policy debate over the proper measurement of
taxable income to a battle over political influence. Friedrich, supra note 185, at 92 ("The
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Indeed, there are strong policy justifications for the continued
viability of the stock-for-debt exception, from both a bankruptcy and tax
perspective. This section of the Article explores the bankruptcy and tax
theories underlying the exception, and proposes that the exception be
reinstated, but modified so that it better comports with current tax policy.
The section also provides solutions to three unresolved tax issues
affecting the exception's application: the preferred stock issue, the use of
parent stock, and the exception's de minimis limitations. It proposes
statutory language that Congress can adopt to implement this proposal.
Finally, the section addresses potential criticisms that might be raised in
opposition to the proposal. It concludes that reinstating the stock-for-debt
exception is a critical step toward reinvigorating the chapter 11
bankruptcy system and encouraging the rehabilitation of financially
trouble corporations.
A. Harmonizing Bankruptcy and Tax Policy
Legal scholarship in the field of debtor-creditor relations tends to
focus exclusively on the bankruptcy aspects of a vexing legal issue. Very
few scholars have attempted to harmonize the often conflicting
bankruptcy policies and tax policies underlying these issues. Similarly,
the congressional committees devoted to addressing tax issues-the
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee-
have often been criticized for passing bankruptcy tax measures as part of
an overall tax reform bill without consulting or coordinating with their
committee counterparts devoted to bankruptcy issues, the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees. Thus, neither academic literature nor
recent legislation has explored the intersection of these two vast bodies of
law. Reinstating and revising the stock-for-debt exception is one small
step toward harmonizing bankruptcy and tax policy. Yet before such a
proposal can be made, it is necessary to ascertain the bankruptcy and tax
policies underlying the stock-for-debt exception prior to its repeal in 1993
and how these policies were in conflict.
loss of this debate about the elusive right answer and its replacement with political
posturing and dealing, where political might makes right, is what I view as the
disintegration of tax policy."); CCH Roundtable, supra note 203, at 542 (stating that the
repeal of the stock-for-debt exception without any hearings being held is "a textbook
example of how dysfunctional our tax legislative process has become!") (comments of
Gordon D. Henderson).
216. See, e.g., Letter from Representative Jack Brooks, Chairman, House
Judiciary Committee, to Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House Committee
on Ways and Means 2 (July 15, 1993) (on file with author) ("I believe it is desirable for
the overall economic policy that changes in the tax law not come at the expense of
longstanding bankruptcy policy and not threaten this nation's job base."); see also Steven
J. Csontos, et al., Roundtable: Congress's Role in Bankruptcy Tax Policy, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 257, 292-93 (1995); Robert A. Jacobs, The Bankruptcy Court's Emergence
as Tax Dispute Arbiter of Choice, 45 TAx LAW. 971, 1029 (1992).
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1. BANKRUPTCY POLICIES UNDERLYING CHAPTER 1 1 AND THE
STOCK-FOR-DEBT EXCEPTION
When Congress created chapter 11 as part of the Bankruptcy Act of
1978, it stated that the primary goal behind chapter 11 was to allow
financially troubled corporations to reorganize and to continue operating
217
as going concerns, rather than to liquidate and sell their assets for scrap.
One commentator aptly called the public policy favoring reorganization
of insolvent businesses rather than liquidation of them as "the single
greatest achievement of our bankruptcy system in the 20th century...,,28
In the legislative history of the 1978 Act, the Senate committee
report explained the policy justifications underlying reorganization rather
than liquidation of financially troubled corporations. The Senate report
emphasized that:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a
liquidation case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it
may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay
its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The
premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used
for production in the industry for which they were designed are
more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap .... If the
business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be returned
to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize
219than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.
217. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
6179. Of course, a number of thoughtful articles have recently been written addressing
exclusively the issue of the purpose of the chapter II bankruptcy system. See, e.g., Kevin
A. Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 161
(1999); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 336 (1993). While this body of scholarship makes it clear that the purposes
underlying chapter 11 might not be as simple as Congress suggested in the legislative
history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, it is not the goal of this Article to rehash
the chapter 11 debate. This Article accepts as one of its premises that chapter 11 was
designed primarily to encourage the rehabilitation rather than liquidation of financially
troubled corporations, and that this is a laudable goal that should be encouraged.
218. Patrick A. Murphy, My Top 10 Secured Creditor Cases of the 20th Century,
35 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Feb. 15, 2000, at 1.
219. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
6179; see also Corwin, supra note 204, at 19 ("The underlying logic of Chapter 11 is that,
where feasible, business reorganization is preferable to liquidation as a means of saving
jobs and maintaining the value of capital assets, to the overall benefit of the U.S.
economy."); Mikel M. Rollyson, Restore Stock-For-Debt, 16 NAT'L L.J., June 6, 1994, at
A19 ("Allowing distressed companies to continue to operate under court supervision while
reorganizing and negotiating with creditors (1) saved jobs; (2) promoted competition by
keeping businesses alive; and (3) stemmed the negative economic 'fallout' of a company
failure.").
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When the stock-for-debt exception was codified in 1980, Congress
justified the exception from a policy perspective as "facilitating corporate
restructuring by permitting debtors to rehabilitate their businesses by
offering equity to creditors without adverse tax consequences, and thus
furthering the general policy to permit financially troubled companies to
be rehabilitated rather than liquidated., 220  Empirical evidence suggests
that the stock-for-debt exception did, in fact, promote chapter 11
rehabilitations by preserving jobs, spurring economic growth, and
fostering competition. For example, experts have estimated that
approximately eighty percent of all corporate restructurings relied on the
stock-for-debt exception before it was repealed in 1993.22I Moreover, the
stock-for-debt exception has played a prominent role in the
reorganizations of a number of mega-chapter 11 bankruptcies, such as
Continental Airlines, Macy's, America West Airlines, Federated
Department Stores (including Bloomingdale's), Zale Corporation, LTV,
and Southland Corporation (including 7-11 stores).222 In fact, without the
stock-for-debt exception, a number of corporations would have been
unable to restructure their debt, which would have had a devastating
impact on the national economy. "K.C. Caldava, chief financial officer of
LTV Corp., the steel company that operated under bankruptcy protection
for seven years, said the company would have been 'devastated and
unable to reorganize without the stock-for-debt provision .... If LTV had
been unable to reorganize, he says, the medical and pension payments of
more than 100,000 retirees would have been eliminated and 17,000 jobs
220. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 208, at 574; see
also S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7026 ("The
committee believes that providing for favorable tax treatment if stock is issued to creditors
in discharge of debt, the committee bill encourages reorganization, rather than liquidation,
of financially distressed companies that have a potential for surviving as operating
concerns."); 140 CONG. Rac. S14465 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("If creditors agree to the [stock-for-debt] exchange, they invest in the reorganized
company's future, reduce the company's debt and preserve the jobs of the company's
employees.").
221. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 15, at 5 (estimate provided by Paul Asofsky,
prominent bankruptcy taxation scholar); Rollyson, supra note 219, at A20.
222. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 15, at 5 ("[The stock-for-debt exception] has
figured importantly in such mega-reorganizations as Continental Airlines, Federated
Department Stores, Ames Department Stores and Southland Corporation."); Rollyson,
supra note 219, at A20 ("Approximately 80 percent of recent corporate restructurings,
including those of major employers such as LTV, Continental Airlines, Southland Corp.
(7-11 stores) and Federated Department Stores, have benefitted from the stock-for-debt
exception."); see also Kathleen M. Berry, Executive Update: Taxes, INVESTOR'S Bus.
DAILY, Aug. 17, 1993, at 4 ("The stock-for-debt exception was crucial to the recent
reorganization plans of a slew of large companies, including Zale Corp., LTV Corp., Trans
World Airlines Inc., Continental Airlines Holdings Inc., and Federated Department Stores
Inc.").
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lost."'' 223 Similarly, bankruptcy attorneys for Macy's and America West
Airlines stated that the companies might have been forced to liquidate had
the stock-for-debt exception not been in existence at the time of the
224
companies' reorganizations.
The stock-for-debt exception was believed by many to be so critical
to an effective chapter 11 reorganization that an unusual alliance formed
to lobby for its reinstatement after it was repealed in 1993. On November
30, 1993, the Ad Hoc Alliance To Preserve Stock-for-Debt Provisions of
the Tax Code, a group comprised of large banks (including Citibank,
Bank of America, Chemical Bank, and Morgan Guaranty Trust); labor
unions (including the United Steelworkers of America, the Teamsters
Union, and the United Auto Workers); major accounting firms (including
Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young, and KPMG Peat Marwick); and
lawyers (representing both debtors and creditors) sent a memorandum to
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees asking that the stock-for-debt
exception be reinstated.22' The Alliance argued that repeal of the
exception would endanger debtors' fresh start policy and would make it
less likely that debtor corporations would be able to reorganize
effectively.226 The Alliance also argued that the large revenue estimates
predicted from the stock-for-debt exception's repeal would not likely be
borne out in reality, because adverse effects, such as longer and more
expensive reorganization proceedings, a greater number of liquidations,
and a significant loss of jobs-costs not considered in the revenue
estimates-would likely offset any increased revenue generated by the
exception's repeal.227 The sheer strength of the Alliance provides strong
evidence that the stock-for-debt exception did, in fact, promote chapter
I l's goals of reorganizing rather than liquidating financially troubled
corporations, preserving jobs, promoting competition, and fostering
economic growth.228
A number of other experts have predicted that, without the stock-for-
debt exception, creditors will be less likely to accept a debtor
corporation's stock in exchange for their indebtedness, insisting on new
223. Berry, supra note 222, at 4.
224. Teena Chadwell, New Provision May Spur End-of-Year Bankruptcies, THE
Bus. J., Oct. 29, 1993, at 3; Thomas Olson, Bankruptcy Change Makes Chapter 11 Even
Less Pleasant, PITTSBURGH Bus. TIMES & J., Oct. 11, 1993, at 1.
225. Memorandum from the Ad Hoc Alliance To Preserve Stock-for-Debt
Provisions of the Tax Code to the House and Senate Judiciary 10 (Nov. 30, 1993) (on file
with author); see also Blackman, supra note 15, at 5; Tom Pratt, Group Opens Drive To
Restore Stock-for-Debt Tax Provision; Rare Alliance Includes Both Bankers and Unions,
INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIG., Dec. 20, 1993, at 14.
226. Ad Hoc Alliance to Preserve Stock-for-Debt Provisions of the Tax Code,
supra note 225, at 1, 10.
227. Id. (attachments); see also Pratt, supra note 225, at 31.
228. See, e.g., Rollyson, supra note 219, at A20 ("The diversity of business and
professional interests joined to support restoration of the stock-for-debt exception attests
to the broad economic benefits it provides.").
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debt instead. 229 This increased use of debt in corporate reorganizations
will reduce the attractiveness of debtor corporations' balance sheets,23°
and will ultimately lead to a significant increase in corporate liquidations
rather than restructurings. 23  A dramatic rise in corporate liquidations will
have a devastating impact on the economy because it will result in lost
jobs232 and less economic competition in the marketplace.233 Moreover,
even successful corporate reorganizations will take longer and be more
costly, thereby depleting valuable resources of a financially troubled
corporation.234 Experts have also predicted that the repeal of the stock-
for-debt exception would have a negative impact on the economy as a
whole, because debtor corporations unable to reorganize successfully and
forced into liquidation might create a domino effect, whereby their
suppliers and lending banks might be forced into bankruptcy as well.235
The extent to which experts' dire predictions about the effects of the
repeal will materialize in practice may be impossible to ascertain.
Official statistics on chapter 11 bankruptcies are woefully inadequate.
For example, statistics are not maintained on the overall success rate of
chapter 11 ;236 thus, no comparison can be made of the viability of chapter
11 reorganizations before and after the repeal of the stock-for-debt
exception. Additionally, the official statistics that are maintained by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts on the number and
229. 140 CONG. REc. S14465 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
David K. Andres, Business Provisions of RRA '93: Higher Rates But Some Benefits, 22
TAX'N FOR LAW. 196, 198-99 (1994); Easton, supra note 213, at 233-34; Olson, supra
note 224, at 1; see also Rollyson, supra note 219, at A20. But see Lee A. Sheppard,
Congress Tries to Work Out the Workout Rules, TAX NOTES, Aug. 10, 1992, at 697
(claiming that the argument that repealing the exception creates a bias against equity is a
non sequitur because creditors are already the true owners of an insolvent company).
230. Csontos, supra note 216, at 289-90; Newton & Wertheim, supra note 187, at
364-65; see also Bob Rossi, Tax Change May Prompt Bankruptcy Boom, THE RECORDER,
Aug. 26, 1993, at 1.
231. See, e.g., Gadsden & Smith, supra note 213, at 226; Newton & Wertheim,
supra note 187, at 365-67; see also Bloomberg Business News, Repeal of Tax Benefit
Might Curb Chapter lls, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 6, 1993, at E3; Chadwell, supra note
224, at 3; Olson, supra note 224, at 1.
232. 140 CONG. REC. S14465 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
CCH Roundtable, supra note 203, at 542; see also Berry, supra note 222, at 4; Rollyson,
supra note 219, at A20.
233. CCH Roundtable, supra note 203, at 542; see also Letter from
Representative Jack Brooks to Representative Dan Rostenkowski, supra note 216, at 1.
234. Easton, supra note 213, at 234; CCH Roundtable, supra note 203, at 542; see
also Edward A. Liva & William H. Tennant, Jr., The Impact of the 1993 Tax Act on Debt
Relief and Workouts, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 1993, at 13, 13.
235. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 15, at 5; Corwin, supra note 204, at 19.
236. Hon. Lisa Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter 11: The Real
World of 500 Cases, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 119, 122 (1996); Elizabeth Warren &
Jay L. Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 499, 506-07 (1999). For a summary of the few limited studies attempting to ascertain
whether chapter I I has been successful, see Fisher & Martel, supra note 2, at 234, 244-47.
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nature (individual versus business) of chapter 11 cases are riddled with
errors. 237  Finally, because of the repeal's delayed effective date,
corporations governed by the new law are just beginning to emerge from
bankruptcy.
2. COMPETING TAX POLICIES
It is relatively clear that the stock-for-debt exception promoted the
three policy goals underlying chapter 11 bankruptcy: favoring
reorganization over liquidation, preserving jobs, and fostering economic
growth through increased competition. Far less clear, however, is
whether the stock-for-debt exception also promoted sound tax policy.
Perhaps the strongest policy underlying the federal income tax
238system is ensuring that true economic income is subject to taxation.
Prior to its repeal, did the stock-for-debt exception further the policy of
taxing true income? As discussed earlier, courts have espoused two
alternative policy justifications in support of the stock-for-debt exception
since its common law inception in 1944: the substitution of liability
theory and the subscription price theory.239 Under the substitution of
liability theory, the debtor corporation merely substitutes one liability,
equity, for another liability, debt, and thus does not free up any assets, as
the debtor did in Kirby Lumber.240 Accordingly, substituting one liability
for another does not trigger any present realization of gain. 24'
Commentators have long criticized Capento Securities and its
progeny for failing to recognize the fundamental distinctions between
242 dbdebt and equity. First, debt represents an unconditional liability of the
corporation that must be repaid even if the corporation recognizes no
profits. Conversely, stock is not an unconditional liability of the
corporation; shareholders will recoup their capital contributions on
237. Jennifer Connors Frasier, Caught in a Cycle of Neglect: The Accuracy of
Bankruptcy Statistics, 101 COM. L.J. 307, 308, 313-18 (1996) (blaming some of the errors
on clerical judgment mistakes and other errors on misreporting by debtors).
238. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., OVERVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 35-36 (1990) (recognizing that the present tax system often,
however, departs from this principle by recognizing broad exceptions); see also Seto,
supra note 35, at 213.
239. Comm'r v. Capento Sec. Corp., 140 F.2d 382, 386 (st Cir. 1946); see also
Comm'r v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122, 127 (1st Cir. 1946). For a more complete
discussion of Capento Securities and Motor Mart Trust, see supra notes 43-59 and
accompanying text.
240. Capento Sec., 140 F.2d at 386; see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying
text.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 229, at 696 ("Indeed, tax lawyers now
acknowledge that the Capento court might have been a bit confused about the differing
natures of debt, which is money that must be repaid, and equity, which is money placed at
the risk of the business.").
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dissolution only if the corporation has assets remaining after paying its
creditors.243 Second, there is a fundamental tax distinction between debt
and equity. A corporation can deduct interest paid to creditors on their
debt; conversely, it is not entitled to deduct dividends paid to shareholders
with respect to their stock. Critics have suggested that the substitution of
liability theory fails to recognize this critical tax distinction.244
The alternative theory underlying the judicially created stock-for-
debt exception is the subscription price theory, which posits that creditors
are merely purchasing the debtor* corporation's stock with their debt
(hence, the face amount of the debt is the subscription price paid for the
stock). Because a corporation is not required to recognize gain or loss on
the issuance of its stock under section 1032 of the Code, this sale of stock
is not taxable to the debtor corporation.245 Under the courts' view, any
difference between the face amount of the indebtedness and the value of
the stock received is merely a premium paid for the stock.246 This theory
has been challenged on the grounds that it fails to comport with economic
reality.
Only pre-existing creditors, and not new shareholders, would
have to "pay" that subscription premium for the debtor's stock,
because of their status as creditors . . . most creditors would
indeed be surprised to learn that money they have advanced to a
corporation in a nonconvertible loan transaction was a "prepaid
subscription price for stock to be issued at an undetermined time
in the future. 247
243. Asofsky, supra note 23, at 13-77 ("[T]he substitution of liability theory is
problematic because a capital stock credit does not represent a fixed obligation as does a
debt."); Bridgeman, supra note 116, at 82 ("[C]haracterizing the stock issued to creditors
as a continuing 'liability' of the debtor is, at best, analytically suspect .... "); Sherck,
supra note 48, at 895 ("That this [substitution of liability] rationale is not entirely
satisfactory is an understatement . . . . A shift from status as a creditor to that of a
preferred, to say nothing of a common, stockholder thus effects a real and substantial
change in the relationship between the corporation and its former debtholder, and effects
an immediate increase in corporate net worth.").
244. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 208, at 574 ("For
tax purposes, a critical difference between stock and debt is that payments of interest on
corporate debt are deductible against the debtor's income, whereas dividend payments to
shareholders are not. The substitution of liability theory does not recognize that crucial
distinction, and fails to provide for a recapture of the benefits of previously claimed
interest deductions by the corporate debtor."); Zachary & Greenwald, supra note 47, at
146 ("[Tjhe substitution of liability theory, while clearly acknowledging that the form of
the liability has changed, ignores the Usually significant tax distinction between debt and
equity.").
245. Capento Sec., 140 F.2d at 386; see also I.R.C. § 1032 (1994); Eustice, supra
note 38, at 240.
246. For a complete discussion of the subscription price theory, see Bryan, supra
note 37, at 107-10.
247. Kenneth J. Kies, Taking a Fresh Look at the Stock-for-Debt Exception, 56
TAX NOTES 1619, 1622 (1992) (quoting Zachary & Greenwald, supra note 47, at 147
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The criticisms of these theoretical underpinnings of the stock-for-
debt exception are generally well founded. In fact, courts stopped using
the subscription price theory to justify the exception shortly after the First
Circuit decided Capento Securities in 1944. Does it follow, then, that
Capento Securities was wrongly decided, and thus there is no theoretical
tax construct supporting the stock-for-debt exception?
It is the position of this Article that the courts in Capento Securities
and its progeny reached the right result, but for the wrong reasons.
Although not articulated by the courts, there is a third, and far more
compelling, tax policy justification for the stock-for-debt exception. It is
premised on a theory first espoused by the Supreme Court in 1931 in a
different context: the open transaction doctrine. In Burnet v. Logan,248 the
taxpayer sold her stock in an iron company, the sales price being
contingent on the amount of iron ore produced in a particular iron mine
over a period of years. In the past, the amount of iron ore produced by the
mine varied dramatically. The Supreme Court rejected the Service's
argument that the taxpayer could estimate the sales price at the time of the
sale, and thus should be taxed on the full gain immediately. Instead, it
held the transaction open until the taxpayer actually received the iron ore
profits each year.249 Thus, in its most basic form, the open transaction
doctrine adopts a wait-and-see approach, wherein the tax consequences of
a transaction remain open until a subsequent event occurs, which closes
the transaction and allows the taxpayer to determine more accurately the
amount of income or loss to be recognized.
Although courts have traditionally used the open transaction doctrine
primarily for the sale of property,5 ° its theoretical underpinnings have a
far broader reach. For example, while it is a well-settled principle of
finance that established securities markets generally value publicly traded
("[T]he subscription price theory can be attacked on the ground that the creditors, in
advancing money to the corporation in the first instance, took a debt obligation and did not
bargain to become equity owners.")).
There are, however, scholars who argue that the subscription price theory is a sound
basis for the stock-for-debt exception because at the time of the exchange, the creditors
are, in fact, the true owners of the company. Therefore, formalizing their true equity
position in an inappropriate time to impose an income tax. See, e.g., Bercik, supra note
47, at 210-11 (relying on Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179
(1942) and Rev. Rul. 59-222, 1959-1 C.B. 80); see also Sherck, supra note 48, at 896
("The 'formalization' of [creditors'] equity position by the actual exchange of debt for
stock thus would not require recognition of gain to the debtor.").
248. 283 U.S. 404, 413 (1931). For an in-depth examination of Burnet and the
open transaction doctrine, see Robert R. Wootton, Mrs. Logan's Ghost: The Open
Transaction Doctrine Today, 71 TAxEs 725 passim (1993).
249. Burnet, 283 U.S. at 412-13. The Court also allowed the taxpayer to recoup
her full basis in the stock before recognizing any gain. Id.
250. Wootton, supra note 248, at 726. Moreover, courts have relied on the
doctrine less frequently in recent years. Id. at 725.
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stocks accurately,25' it is equally clear that the same securities markets are
incapable of accurately valuing the stock of a financially distressed
corporation, particularly one involved in a chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding.252  Accordingly, in the absence of the stock-for-debt
exception, when a bankrupt or insolvent corporation exchanges its stock
for its creditors' indebtedness, it will realize discharge of indebtedness
251. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: 11, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1607 (1991)
("[O]n average stock prices adjust quickly to information about investment decisions,
dividend changes, changes in capital structure, and corporate-control transactions.");
Christopher P. Saari, Comment, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic
Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 passim
(1977). "A market in which prices always fully reflect available information is an
'efficient' market .... The empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the hypothesis
that modem American capital markets are efficient, and few economists deny the validity
of this view." Id. at 1031; see also Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and
Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 26 (1988) ("Although the evidence is not literally
100 percent in support of the efficient market hypothesis, no proposition in any of the
sciences is better documented."); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really
Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1240-41
(1990). Cf. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON
OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 39 (1976) (recognizing
that there are three forms of market efficiency: the "weak" form, which states that the
market accurately reflects historical information on market prices; the "semi-strong" form,
which provides that stock prices fully reflect public information regarding companies,
including their financial statements; and the "strong" form, which suggests that market
prices reflect all information, including inside information. The author concludes that
empirical evidence generally confirms that United States markets are efficient under the
weak and semi-strong forms of market efficiency, but that the strong form of market
efficiency "is not generally supported by the limited available evidence."); JAMES H.
LORE ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 73 (2d ed. 1985) ("The
evidence has become so persuasive that it is fair to conclude that the semi-strong form of
market efficiency is now an accepted working assumption in financial economics
research."). There are, however, those who disagree about the efficiency of established
securities markets. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in
Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 277, 342 (1990) ("The stock market is not 100%
efficient in the sense that share price mirrors fundamental economic value.").
252. Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganizations, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 passim (1983). "The values assigned in
reorganization are believed often to have been inaccurate when compared to long-run
market values." Id. at 562 n.124. See also Citibank, N.A. v. Baer, 651 F.2d 1341, 1347-
48 (10th Cir. 1980):
The actual value of stock depends on a number of different factors, including
the future earning potential of the company as perceived by outside investors.
With a newly reorganized company coming from the throes of bankruptcy, the
actual market value of a share of stock may be considerably less than the pro-
rata portion of the going-concern value of the company represented by that
stock.
Id.; In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am., 416 F. Supp. 132, 145 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(stating that, because of the uncertainties associated with corporations emerging
from bankruptcy proceedings, including initial selling pressure, the stock of such a
company could trade at less than its reorganization value in the near term);
Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority
of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 289 (1990).
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income equal to the excess of the debt cancelled over the highly depressed
value of the stock issued in the exchange, and will be required to reduce
its tax attributes, such as net operating loss carryovers, by a like
amount.2" If, however, the open transaction doctrine governs the
exchange, the debtor corporation could postpone its realization of debt
discharge income and corresponding tax attribute reduction until the
creditor sold its stock, establishing an accurate valuation of the stock for
254purposes of calculating the debtor's debt discharge amount. Thus, using
the open transaction doctrine as the tax policy justification for the stock-
for-debt exception would have the effect of converting the exception from
an exclusionary provision, where potential debt discharge income is never
taxed, to a mere deferral provision, where debt discharge income is
measured and taxed when the creditor subsequently sells or redeems its
255thoeia
stock, thereby closing the open transaction. This theoretical
underpinning for the exception can ultimately be justified from a tax
perspective because it satisfies one of the first principles of income
taxation: taxing true economic income.
B. Reinstating the Stock-for-Debt Exception: A Modest Proposal
Reinstating the stock-for-debt exception will not resolve all of the
ills plaguing the chapter 11 bankruptcy system. However, reinstating the
exception, which was, after all, repealed for purely political reasons
without any hearings or debate, will improve the ability of many
corporations to reorganize successfully and will bring the chapter I 1
system one step closer to achieving its goals of preserving jobs,
promoting competition, fostering economic growth, and rehabilitating
troubled businesses.
Congress should reinstate the stock-for-debt exception only for
insolvent corporations and those involved in title 11 bankruptcy
proceedings. To reinstate the exception for solvent corporations not in
bankruptcy would fail to recognize fundamental distinctions between
solvent corporations, on the one hand, and insolvent and bankrupt
corporations, on the other. First, the amount of debt discharge income
253. For a more detailed discussion of discharge of indebtedness income and
corresponding tax attribute reduction, see supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
254. Considering how logical it is to apply the open transaction doctrine to
exchanges of stock-for-debt, it is surprising that scholars have not seriously debated it
before. For a brief discussion of the open transaction doctrine in this context nearly ten
years ago, see Bercik, supra note 47, at 214-16; Sherck, supra note 48, at 896-98.
255. One commentator has argued that the open transaction doctrine cannot be
used in such an instance because it would run afoul of I.R.C. § 1032 (1994), which
provides generally that retiring stock for less than its issue price does not result in taxable
income to the corporation. Sherck, supra note 48, at 896. This argument is flawed,
however, because under current law (after the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception), even
the mere issuance of stock by a debtor corporation results in discharge of indebtedness
income, also contravening the fundamental principles of section 1032 of the Code.
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realized by a solvent corporation can be easily ascertained because the
value of its stock issued in the exchange can be readily valued.256
Conversely, accurately establishing the value of stock issued by an
insolvent or bankrupt corporation in a stock-for-debt exchange is nearly
impossible; thus the amount of the corporation's debt discharge income
would be highly speculative.25 7 Moreover, solvent corporations have the
funds available to satisfy a tax liability based on their debt discharge
income, while insolvent and bankrupt corporations usually do not.
Finally, past experience indicates that solvent corporations will use the
stock-for-debt exception for tax avoidance schemes,258 while there is little
risk that their insolvent or bankrupt counterparts will do the same.
Yet reinstating the stock-for-debt exception is merely the starting
point. To be sure, reinstating the exception furthers bankruptcy policy,
but what of tax policy? The judicially established tax theories underlying
the stock-for-debt exception, the substitution of liability theory and the
subscription price theory, have been thoroughly discredited by scholars
over the years. 259 The only remaining theory that can justify the stock-
for-debt exception from a tax policy perspective is the open transaction
doctrine discussed in this Article.260  Recall that the open transaction
doctrine, which basically adopts a wait-and-see approach, is premised on
the assumption that the tax consequences of certain transactions cannot be
determined with reasonable accuracy until subsequent events occur that
close those transactions. Under this proposal, an insolvent corporation or
one involved in a bankruptcy proceeding can invoke the stock-for-debt
exception to avoid cancellation of indebtedness income at the time of the
stock-for-debt exchange. When a creditor that has received stock in
exchange for its indebtedness subsequently sells or otherwise disposes of
the stock, however, the open transaction doctrine dictates that the
transaction will close and the debtor will then realize debt discharge
income equal to the difference between the selling price of the stock and
the face amount of the indebtedness that had been exchanged for that
stock. 26' This debt discharge income will reduce the debtor corporation's
256. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
257. For a more complete discussion of the problems inherent in valuing such
stock, see supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text for an in-depth examination of
the tax avoidance schemes concocted with the stock-for-debt exception in the early 1980s.
259. For a thorough examination of these theories and the attacks that have been
waged against them, see supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
261. This selling price should be unreduced by costs or other commissions that
the creditor incurs to sell the stock. This will insure parallel treatment of stock-for-debt
exchanges and exchanges in which a creditor receives other property in partial satisfaction
of its indebtedness. In the latter case, the debtor corporation's income from discharge of
indebtedness is calculated by subtracting the fair market value of the property, unreduced
by any selling costs incurred by the creditor, from the face amount of indebtedness
discharged in the exchange. I.R.C. § 108(b) (1994).
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tax attributes, or, alternatively, its basis in its depreciable property, in
accordance with sections 108(b) and 1017(b) of the Code.262
The following example will illustrate the application of this proposal.
Assume that D, a financially troubled corporation under the jurisdiction of
a bankruptcy court in a chapter 11 reorganization proceeding, has two
creditors, each with a $200,000 debt outstanding. As part of its
reorganization plan approved by the bankruptcy court, D pays each
creditor $25,000 cash and issues 10,000 shares of stock to each of them
(the 20,000 shares represent half of the shares of D outstanding). The
stock has a fair market value of $4 per share at the time of the
transaction. 263  The creditors agree to cancel their debt as part of the
exchange.
Because D is involved in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, it can
avail itself of the stock-for-debt exception, as long as the stock that it has
issued to its creditors is not nominal or token. As discussed in Part V,
stock issued in a stock-for-debt exchange will not be considered nominal
or token under the proposal if it represents more than ten percent of the
total stock of the debtor corporation outstanding after the exchange. The
stock issued to D's creditors far exceeds this threshold, representing fifty
percent of D's outstanding stock after the exchange. Thus, D's exchange
qualifies for the stock-for-debt exception, and it will recognize no debt
discharge income at the time of the transaction.
Further assume that D's first creditor sells its stock three years later
for $140,000. Inasmuch as the creditor's original indebtedness was
$200,000, and it received $25,000 cash in the exchange, only $175,000 of
the indebtedness was cancelled in exchange for stock. Because the
original stock-for-debt transaction closes as a result of the creditor's sale
or disposition of its stock, D will realize $35,000 of debt discharge
A creditor can, of course, dispose of the debtor corporation's stock without selling
it. For example, if the creditor makes a gift of the stock, there has been a disposition
without a sale or exchange. In such a case, the debtor's debt discharge income should be
calculated by making the selling price equal to the fair market value of the stock on the
date of the gift. Similarly, if a parent corporation liquidates one of its subsidiaries into
itself (generally on a tax-free basis pursuant to I.R.C. § 332 (1994)), after receiving the
subsidiary's stock in a stock-for-debt exchange, the liquidation will constitute a
disposition of the stock, even though no sale has occurred. As in the gift situation, the fair
market value of the subsidiary's stock on the date of the liquidation will be the deemed
selling price for purposes of calculating the subsidiary's discharge of indebtedness
amount.
262. For a comprehensive examination of tax attribute reduction under I.R.C. §
108(b) (1994), as well as the alternative election to reduce the debtor's basis in its
depreciable property pursuant to I.R.C. § 1017(b) (1994), see supra notes 83-85 and
accompanying text.
263. This stock valuation appears to be exceedingly low, however, because the
liquidation value of D's assets alone should give the stock a value in excess of $6 per
share.
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income, and thus will reduce its tax attributes by that amount.26 If D's
second creditor sells its D stock the following year for $250,000, D will
realize no discharge of indebtedness income at the time of the sale,
because under the open transaction doctrine's wait-and-see approach, the
value of D's stock "grew into" the indebtedness cancelled in the
exchange, thus resulting in no discharge of indebtedness income.265
One potential problem with the proposal is that it would allow
creditors to control the debtor corporation's tax consequences. 266  If
creditors sell their stock shortly after they receive it in a stock-for-debt
exchange, the value of the stock is still likely to be depressed because of
the bankruptcy proceeding or insolvency workout.267 This premature sale
could cause the debtor corporation to realize an artificially high level of
debt discharge income.
But why would creditors agree to accept stock in the exchange and
then sell it so quickly? The fact is that most creditors have two distinct
incentives to do so. First, federal banking regulations require that certain
banks dispose of all stock received in exchange for their indebtedness
within two years after receiving it.268 Thus, bank creditors have strong
incentives to dispose of their stock quickly to satisfy the two-year holding
period rule.269
The second reason that creditors might prematurely sell stock that
they receive in a stock-for-debt exchange is to trigger favorable tax
consequences for themselves. If, for example, a creditor holds long-term
indebtedness, and then exchanges that indebtedness for the debtor
264. This $35,000 figure represents the difference between the $175,000 debt
cancelled in exchange for stock, and the $140,000 value of the stock determined at the
time of the creditor's sale.
265. Conversely, under current law, D would realize $270,000 of debt discharge
income at the time of the original exchanges of stock for debt, and would be required to
reduce its tax attributes by that amount. This figure represents the $400,000 of debt
cancelled in the exchange, less the $50,000 of cash issued to the creditors plus the $80,000
fair market value of the stock (20,000 shares at $4 per share).
266. Bercik, supra note 47, at 215 ("[A problem] created by the open transaction
doctrine is that the debtor corporation's future recognition of COD income is not within its
control .... The corporation would be at the mercy of its creditors.").
267. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
268. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(c)(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1999) ("[Sjhares acquired by
a bank holding company or any of its subsidiaries in satisfaction of a debt previously
contracted in good faith.., shall be disposed of within a period of two years from the date
on which they were acquired .... "). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System can extend the initial two-year holding period for up to a ten-year period after the
bank initially acquires the stock if the extension(s) "would not be detrimental to the public
interest." Id. After the initial five year period, either the bank has attempted in good faith
to sell the stock or such a sale "would have been detrimental to the company." Id. For the
definition of a bank holding company, see 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a) (West 1989 & Supp.
1999).
269. SUBCOMM. ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 96TH CONG., WRITTEN COMMENTS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF H.R. 5043,
BANKRUPTCY TAX ACT OF 1979, at 30 (Comm. Print 1980).
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corporation's stock, the creditor will not be entitled to recognize any loss
on the exchange270 because the exchange qualifies as a tax-free
recapitalization.27' Thus, the creditor would have the incentive to sell the
debtor's stock quickly to be entitled to deduct its loss (unless the creditor
was relatively confident that the debtor's stock would appreciate
significantly in value).272  Thus, favorable tax consequences often
encourage creditors to dispose of their stock received in a stock-for-debt
exchange prematurely.
Although creditors have both regulatory and tax incentives to sell the
stock that they receive from a financially troubled corporation quickly, a
premature disposition of the stock will not allow for a proper
measurement of the debtor corporation's discharge of indebtedness
income because market forces will not yet have had the opportunity to
value the debtor's stock accurately. Accordingly, the debtor corporation's
discharge of indebtedness income should not be determined until the first
sale of each block of stock occurring more than two years after the
270. There would be a realized loss if the face amount of the debt exceeded the
fair market value of the stock received, a likely occurrence in the case of an insolvent
debtor corporation or one involved in a bankruptcy reorganization. I.R.C. § 1001 (1994).
271. I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1) (1994), 368(a)(1)(E) (1994). The transaction will qualify
as a tax-free recapitalization only if the indebtedness cancelled in the exchange qualifies
as a security. I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(A)(i) (1994). Although the Code does not define the
term security for these purposes, case law and pronouncements by the Service have
generally filled in the gaps. For example, indebtedness with an original maturity date
greater than five years is usually deemed a security. Rev. Rul. 59-98, 1959-1 C.B. 76.
Conversely, debts with a maturity date of five years or less usually do not constitute
securities. Neville Coke and Chem. Co. v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 726, 726-27 (1945). Thus, short-term creditors of the debtor, such as its trade
creditors, will not fall within these reorganization rules, and their exchange of stock for
debt will be a taxable transaction, allowing them to recognize a loss at the time of the
exchange. I.R.C. § 1001 (1994).
It should be noted that, to the extent that the stock received by a creditor in a tax-free
recapitalization represents accrued interest on the old indebtedness, the non-recognition
rules described above do not apply, and the transaction would be taxable to the creditor to
the extent of the fair market value of the stock received that represents accrued but unpaid
interest. I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(B) (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
272. At the time of the sale, the creditor would generally recognize a loss equal to
the difference between the amount realized on the stock sale, less the adjusted basis (often
the face amount) of the debt cancelled in the stock-for-debt exchange. I.R.C. § 1001
(1994). If, however, the creditor had previously taken a bad debt deduction under I.R.C. §
166 (1994), that deduction would reduce the creditor's adjusted basis in its debt, and the
sale could produce a gain rather than a loss. The gain would be recaptured as ordinary
income to the extent that the previous bad debt deductions were ordinary losses rather than
capital losses. I.R.C. § 108(e)(7) (1994). In such a case, the creditor would have less
incentive to dispose of its stock received in the exchange prematurely because the
transaction would produce a gain rather than a loss. For a more comprehensive discussion
of the tax treatment to a creditor in a stock-for-debt exchange, see Asofsky, supra note 58,
at 626-33; Mary Kate Wold, A Comprehensive Tax Guide for Corporate Workouts, 456
PRACTICING L. INST. 1087, 1149-57 (1999); see also 15 MYRON M. SHEINFELD ET AL.,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ch. TX7 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1999).
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original stock-for-debt exchange.273 Thus, creditors that receive stock in
exchange for their indebtedness will merely be required to notify the
debtor corporation of any sale or disposition of that stock.274 If the sale or
disposition occurs more than two years after the original exchange, the
debtor can calculate its debt discharge income and corresponding tax
attribute reduction with respect to the selling creditor at the time.2 75 If,
however, the sale or disposition occurs within two years of the original
stock-for-debt exchange, the purchaser will be subject to the same
reporting requirements as the original creditor, and the debtor corporation
will compute its debt discharge amount following the purchaser's sale or
other disposition.276
As outlined above, the stock-for-debt exception that existed before
its repeal in 1993 furthered sound bankruptcy policy at the cost of tax
policy. By expanding the scope of the open transaction doctrine to the
field of bankruptcy taxation, and coupling it with the two-year limitation
described in this section, this proposal is the first to envision a stock-for-
debt exception that promotes both sound bankruptcy and tax policy.
2 77
273. One possible solution to the premature sale problem is to lock up the stock
for a period of time, such as two years, so that creditors are prohibited from selling their
stock during that period. See, e.g., Bercik, supra note 47, at 215-16. The problems with
this approach are twofold. First, creditors do, in fact, have valid business and economic
reasons for selling the debtor's stock early. Thus, a stock lock-up would violate notions of
tax efficiency by encouraging actions to be taken solely for tax purposes rather than for
valid economic reasons. For a more complete discussion of the concept of tax efficiency,
see infra notes 305-12 and accompanying text. Second, under a stock lock-up, creditors
are not actually prohibited from selling their stock; instead, they are liable for the debtor's
adverse tax consequences if they do. If the creditor is in financial difficulty, the debtor's
lawsuit might represent merely a pyrrhic victory because the debtor is unable to collect on
its judgment from the creditor. For these reasons, this Article rejects the suggestion of a
stock lock-up.
274. The notification must include the date of the sale or disposition, the selling
price, if relevant, and the name, address, and social security number or taxpayer's
identification number of the purchasers or recipients of the stock.
275. For an explanation of how this calculation is made, see supra notes 261-65
and accompanying text.
276. Of course, if the purchaser's sale or other disposition occurs within the two-
year period as well, the debtor will not compute its debt discharge income and tax attribute
reduction until the conclusion of the first sale after such two-year period.
277. This proposal is not complete until it addresses one final, highly technical,
aspect of the stock-for-debt exception. Before its amendment in 1993, section 382()(5) of
the Code provided that, if a corporation experienced an ownership change while involved
in a title 11 bankruptcy proceeding or similar case, and following the ownership change,
former creditors and shareholders held at least fifty percent of the corporation's stock by
vote and value, the corporation was required to reduce its net operating loss carryovers by,
among other reductions, half of the debt discharge income protected by the stock-for-debt
exception. I.R.C. § 382()(5) (1994). For the definition of an ownership change under
section 382, see infra note 286 and accompanying text; see also Arnopol, supra note 28, at
168-72. Under this proposal, the debtor corporation will ultimately recognize all debt
discharge income by way of tax attribute reduction at the time that the creditors or
subsequent purchasers sell or dispose of their stock received in the exchange.
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1. UNRESOLVED TAX ISSUES
A proposal calling for the reinstatement of the stock-for-debt
exception is not complete unless it addresses the three unresolved issues
regarding the exception's practical application. First, should preferred
stock qualify as stock for purposes of the exception, and, if so, to what
extent? Second, should a subsidiary be allowed to issue stock of its
parent corporation in exchange for its own indebtedness under the stock-
for-debt exception? Finally, should any limitations be set on the
minimum amount of stock that a debtor corporation must issue in order to
qualify for the exception? The three subsections below resolve these
difficult tax issues.
Accordingly, to require that the corporation also reduce its net operating loss carryovers
by half of its debt discharge income protected by the stock-for-debt exception would result
in "double dipping" by the government. Therefore, this Article suggests that no
amendment be made to section 382(l)(5) if this proposal is adopted.
This proposal would also be incomplete if it did not address an alternative proposal
to relieve the harsh tax consequences resulting from the repeal of the stock-for-debt
exception. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission, which was established by
Congress as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, appointed a Special Task Force
to consider tax recommendations to be included in the Commission's final report to
Congress. The Task Force prepared a special report addressing a number of bankruptcy
taxation issues, one of which involved the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception. The
Task Force first recognized that the repeal of the exception would result in the liquidation
rather than reorganization of financially distressed companies, which was inconsistent
with the general bankruptcy policy of encouraging rehabilitation. PAUL H. ASOFSKY &
ROBERT E. MCKENZIE, REPORT OF THE ABA TAX SECTION TASK FORCE ON THE TAX
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION 204 (1997) (on
file with author). The report recommended that, in order to remedy this policy distortion,
Congress should amend section 108 of the Code to allow a corporation in bankruptcy to
make a "fresh start" election. The ultimate effect of this election would be to allow the
debtor corporation to use a larger percentage of its net operating losses each year
following its bankruptcy reorganization than would be permitted under present law. Id. at
205 ("[The debtor would be] entitled to a 'fresh start net operating loss carryforward'
which will be equal to 5 times [the debtor's] annual limit under Section 382, as determined
using equity value as set forth in Section 382(l)(6) and accompanying regulations.")
(emphasis added).
While the Task Force's proposal should be commended for recognizing the tax
inequities resulting from the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception, it is a wholly
inadequate remedy for these inequities because the proposal is premised on ascertaining
the value of the corporation immediately after bankruptcy. As discussed supra note 252
and accompanying text, the value of a corporation emerging from bankruptcy
reorganization cannot be adequately ascertained. Thus, it is contended that the Task
Force's proposal, if implemented, would not have a reasonable likelihood of success in
practice.
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a. The Preferred Stock Issue
Recall that, prior to the repeal of the. stock-for-debt exception in
1993, the Code provided that certain types of preferred stock with a stated
redemption price would be treated as "disqualified stock," and thus could
not be used by a financially troubled corporation to satisfy the stock-for-
debt exception.278 This congressional position on the preferred stock
issue was in direct conflict with the Service's own ruling position on the
issue, which allowed preferred stock to qualify for the exception, but only
to the extent of the stock's redemption price or liquidation preference.279
If Congress reinstates the stock-for-debt exception, it should adopt
the Service's ruling position and permit preferred stock to qualify for the
stock-for-debt exception to the extent of the greater of its stated
redemption price or its liquidation preference. 280  This solution best
comports with the policy justification underlying the exception, the open
transaction theory.
Under the open transaction theory, even if preferred stock issued by
a troubled corporation in exchange for its indebtedness has a fair market
value far below the debt being cancelled in the exchange, the stock
nevertheless has a potential to increase in value in the creditor's hands.
As the value of the preferred stock rises, the amount of indebtedness
actually cancelled without the receipt of consideration decreases. Thus, it
is possible that by the time that the creditor sells the preferred stock, the
debtor corporation will have suffered no discharge of indebtedness
income, because the preferred stock will have grown into the value of the
cancelled debt. Therefore, this Article's paradigm provides that preferred
stock should qualify, as stock for purposes of determining a bankrupt or
insolvent corporation's discharge of indebtedness income under the stock-
for-debt exception.
Still, there are limitations on the extent to which preferred stock can
increase in value. Its value will never exceed the greater of its stated
redemption price or its liquidation preference. 21 Accordingly, based on
the open transaction doctrine, the excess of the cancelled debt over the
greater of the preferred stock's redemption price or liquidation preference
should constitute discharge of indebtedness income to the debtor
278. Disqualified stock was defined as preferred stock with a stated redemption
price that either was subject to a "put" at the option of the holder of the stock, a "call" at
the option of its issuer, or had a fixed redemption date. I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(B)(ii)
(repealed 1993). For a more complete discussion of disqualified stock, see supra notes
113-15 and accompanying text.
279. Rev. Rul. 90-87, 1990-2 C.B. 32.
280. If stock is denoted as preferred stock but has neither a stated redemption
price nor a liquidation preference, then under this proposal it will be treated as common
stock for purposes of the stock-for-debt exception.
281. See, e.g., HENDERSON& GOLDR[NG,supra note 18, at 105.
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corporation at the time of the exchange, and the corporation should be
required to reduce its tax attributes by a like amount.
282
A simple example should illustrate the intended application of this
general preferred stock rule and its limitation. Assume that B is a
corporation that has filed for bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. As part of its plan of reorganization, B issues preferred
stock with a current fair market value of $40,000 and a redemption price
and liquidation preference of $150,000 in exchange for a creditor's
unsecured debt of $200,000. The creditor receives no other property in
exchange for its debt. Under the proposal outlined in this Article, B will
realize $50,000 of discharge of indebtedness income at the time of the
exchange,283 and will reduce its tax attributes by that amount. B will not
realize any other income at the time of the exchange, but may realize
further discharge of indebtedness income at the time that the creditor sells
the preferred stock, equal to the difference between the selling price of the
preferred stock and the $150,000 of debt cancelled in exchange for the
stock. 4
b. The Use of Parent Stock
If the stock-for-debt exception is reinstated, a subsidiary corporation
that is insolvent or in a title 11 bankruptcy proceeding should be entitled
to use its parent's stock to satisfy its own indebtedness for three reasons.
First, a creditor would be more likely to accept the stock of a parent
corporation that is not insolvent or involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Such parent stock is obviously more attractive because it can be more
readily traded and clearly has a better chance of yielding a return equal to
or greater than the cancelled debt.285 The lure of parent stock might also
allow subsidiaries to negotiate debt cancellation that otherwise would not
occur, thereby encouraging reorganization over liquidation.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, issuing parent stock
allows the parent and subsidiary to retain two tax advantages that are
282. For a detailed discussion of discharge of indebtedness income and
corresponding tax attribute reduction, see supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text. If
both preferred and common stock are issued to a creditor in exchange for its indebtedness,
however, and neither the preferred nor the common stock is de minimis, then the preferred
stock will be deemed to satisfy indebtedness to the extent of the greater of its redemption
price or liquidation preference, and the common stock will be deemed to satisfy the
remaining indebtedness. Accordingly, the debtor corporation would realize no discharge
of indebtedness income at the time of the stock-for-debt exchange. For a discussion of
this proposal's de minimis limitations, see infra notes 292-98 and accompanying text.
283. This $50,000 figure is equal to the $200,000 debt cancelled less the greater
of the preferred stock's redemption price or liquidation preference (both are equal in this
case) of $150,000.
284. For a more complete explanation of how this calculation is made, see supra
notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
285. Bridgeman, supra note 116, at 81.
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crucial to a successful reorganization: preservation of the subsidiary's net
operating loss carryovers and the ability of the parent and subsidiary to
file consolidated tax returns. A subsidiary can lose the immediate use of
its net operating losses by issuing more than fifty percent of its common
stock to creditors (called an "ownership change").286 It can lose the
privilege of filing consolidated returns with its parent corporation if it
issues more than twenty percent of its stock to creditors.21' It is very
likely that a bankrupt or insolvent subsidiary would be required to issue
more than twenty percent of its stock in order to satisfy the claims of
creditors, thereby deconsolidating the parent and subsidiary. 288 Moreover,
oftentimes the subsidiary must issue over fifty percent of its stock to
satisfy creditors' claims, thus limiting the ability of the parent corporation
to use the subsidiary's net operating losses to offset its own income.
On the other hand, a parent corporation with more valuable stock can
issue less stock and thereby avoid an ownership change, deconsolidation,
or both. Unfortunately, if the stock-for-debt exception is reinstated
without clarifying the parent stock issue, there is a risk that a court might
hold that parent stock does not qualify as stock of the debtor for purposes
of the stock-for-debt exception. In that case, the subsidiary corporation
would realize discharge of indebtedness income and would be forced to
reduce one of its most valuable tax attributes, net operating losses, by the
amount of its cancellation of indebtedness income. Thus, one of the
primary advantages of using parent stock (retaining the subsidiary's net
operating losses by issuing less stock and avoiding an ownership charge)
would be lost.2
89
Finally, treating parent stock as stock of the debtor for purposes of
the stock-for-debt exception would allow for parallel tax treatment of
debtor corporations and creditors under the Code. As discussed
previously, section 108(e)(7), which outlines the creditor's tax
consequences in a stock-for-debt exchange, provides that stock of the
286. If a corporation issues more than fifty percent of its stock to creditors, an
ownership change will be triggered pursuant to I.R.C. § 382(g) (1994). After an
ownership change occurs, the new owners' subsequent use of the corporation's existing
net operating losses will be significantly restricted. I.R.C. § 382(a), (b)(l) (1994). But see
I.R.C. § 382()(5)-(6) (1994). For a comprehensive discussion of the Code's net operating
loss limitations following an ownership change, see Arnopol, supra note 28, at 164-73.
287. I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504 (1994); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-1(a) (as amended
in 1999). A deconsolidation of the parent and subsidiary could also result in other adverse
tax consequences, such as triggering deferred intercompany gain under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1502-13 (as amended in 1999); see also Boshkov, supra note 116, at 224; Bridgeman,
supra note 116, at 81-82. For a comprehensive list of adverse tax consequences resulting
from the termination of a consolidated group, see FRED W. PEEL, JR. ET AL.,
CONSOLIDATED TAX RETuRNs § 23.01 (3d ed. 1984).
288. Bridgeman, supra note 116, at 81.
289. For a discussion of how discharge of indebtedness income is triggered,
causing a reduction of the debtor corporation's net operating losses and other tax
attributes, see supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
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debtor's parent should be treated as stock of the debtor for purposes of
that section. 290 As a matter of statutory interpretation, stock as a debtor's
parent corporation should similarly be treated as stock of the debtor for
purposes of determining the debtor's tax consequences in the same
exchange.29'
c. De Minimis Limitations
Allowing an insolvent corporation or one in bankruptcy to avail itself
of the stock-for-debt exception when it has issued no real equity interest
to its creditors would elevate form over substance. Accordingly, a
financially troubled corporation should not be able to use the stock-for-
debt exception if it issues only a de minimis amount of stock to its
creditors in exchange for their indebtedness. The parameters of the de
minimis limitation under this proposal are explored below.
Recall that, under the law in existence at the time of the exception's
repeal, a debtor corporation had to meet two tests in order to satisfy the
Code's de minimis limitation. First, the stock issued to the corporation's
creditors in exchange for their debt could not be nominal or token.292
Second, the amount of stock issued to an unsecured creditor could not be
disproportionately low in relation to the amount of stock issued to all
unsecured creditors. 3 In each case, the value of the stock issued to
creditors was critical in determining whether the nominal or token and
disproportionality tests were met.' 94
One of the fundamental principles upon which this Article is based is
that it is impossible to value the stock of a bankrupt or insolvent
290. I.R.C. § 108(e)(7)(C) (1994). For a more complete discussion of this
provision, see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
291. It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that an identical word or
phrase appearing in several locations of the same statute or section thereof should be
defined and interpreted consistently throughout the statute or section. WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 264-65 (2000)
(quoting Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
569 (1995)).
292. For an in-depth discussion of the nominal or token limitation, see supra notes
151-62 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 163-77 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of
the disproportionality limitation.
294. For example, under Revenue Procedure 94-26, 1994-1 C.B. 612, stock would
not be considered nominal or token if the value of common stock issued in exchange for
unsecured indebtedness was at least fifteen percent of the value of all stock outstanding
after the bankruptcy proceeding or insolvency workout. See supra notes 161-62 and
accompanying text. Similarly, under Technical Advice Memorandum 88-37-001 (May
10, 1988), the Service ruled that the value of preferred stock issued in exchange for
indebtedness was not nominal or token because the value was approximately ten percent
of the face amount of debt cancelled in the exchange. For a more complete discussion of
this ruling, see supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text; see also Sherck, supra note 48,
at 902.
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corporation accurately. 95 Therefore, any test that focuses on the value of'
the debtor corporation's stock in determining whether it is de minimis is,
in the end, futile.
Accordingly, under this proposal, stock issued in a stock-for-debt
exchange will not be deemed nominal or token if those creditors
participating in the exchange receive stock representing at least ten
percent of the total amount of stock outstanding after the exchange
occurs. This nominal or token test will apply both to exchanges of stock
for debt in a title 11 bankruptcy proceeding, as well as to stock-for-debt
exchanges occurring as part of an informal insolvency workout.296
Finally, this Article proposes that the disproportionality test not be
reinstated as part of the proposal. As one commentator aptly noted, the
disproportionality test encouraged classes of unsecured creditors with
differing priorities to alter the mix of stock and other consideration to be
paid to each class in order to satisfy the disproportionality test.297 He
concluded that "the policy aim of efficiency in the income tax system is
thus frustrated. Complicated and heated negotiations between different
classes of creditors to preserve favorable tax consequences to the debtor
under the stock-for-debt exception also can be counterproductive and
delay a bankruptcy reorganization. 298  Therefore, because the
disproportionality test would encourage tax inefficiency, and inasmuch as
the nominal or token test set forth above satisfies the concern that debtors
will avail themselves of the stock-for-debt exception without giving
creditors a real equity interest in the enterprise, the proposal eliminates
the disproportionality test as part of the Code's de minimis limitation.
2. PROPOSED STATUTORY LANGUAGE
If the proposal outlined in this Article is adopted, Congress will be
required to amend section 108 of the Code substantially. The
amendments should address the tax treatment of exchanges of stock for
debt generally, the application of the stock-for-debt exception in the case
of insolvent corporations and those involved in title 11 bankruptcy
proceedings, limitations on the application of the exception, and the
treatment of both preferred and parent stock under the exception. The
remainder of this section proposes precise statutory language that can be
adopted by Congress in implementing this proposal, providing cross-
295. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
296. A debtor with two or more classes of stock outstanding presents special
problems. Because preferred and common stock often have different values, the proposal
suggests that the ten percent test be applied separately with respect to each class of stock
outstanding.
297. Kies, supra note 247, at 1625-26.
298. Id. at 1626.
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references in footnotes to the sections of the Article that explore each
issue in greater detail.
Paragraph 108(e)(8) shall be repealed in its entirety, and replaced
with the following:
(8) Indebtedness satisfied by corporation's stock.
(A) In general. For purposes of determining income of a
debtor from discharge of indebtedness, if a debtor
corporation transfers stock to a creditor in satisfaction of its
indebtedness, such corporation shall be treated as having
satisfied the indebtedness with an amount of money equal
to the fair market value of the stock.299
(B) The stock-for-debt exception for certain stock in title
11 cases and insolvent debtors.
(i) In general. Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to
any transfer of stock of the debtor-
(I) by a debtor in a title 11 case, or
(II) by any other debtor, but only to the extent
that such debtor is insolvent.300
(ii) Stock-for-debt exception not to apply in de
minimis cases. For purposes of determining income
of the debtor from discharge of indebtedness, the
stock-for-debt exception shall not apply to the
issuance of nominal or. token shares.30'
(iii) Nominal or token shares defined.: For purposes
of clause (ii), the term "nominal or token shares"
means stock, issued in exchange for indebtedness in a
title 11 proceeding or insolvency workout, which
299. This subparagraph establishes the general rule for solvent corporations not in
bankruptcy that stock is treated the same as any other asset transferred by the corporation
for purposes of calculating its income from discharge of indebtedness. For a discussion of
why the stock-for-debt exception is inapplicable to solvent debtors not in bankruptcy, see
supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
300. This clause sets forth the stock-for-debt exception generally, providing that it
applies only if the debtor corporation is insolvent or in bankruptcy. For a more complete
explanation of the bankruptcy and tax policies underlying the stock-for-debt exception, see
supra notes 217-55 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 292-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of this de
minimis limitation and its application to the stock-for-debt exception.
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represents less than 10 percent of the amount of all
stock outstanding at the conclusion of the title 11
proceeding or insolvency workout. Such
determination shall be made on a class-by-class
basis.3°2
(iv) Use of preferred stock. Stock with a stated
redemption price or liquidation preference shall be
treated as stock for purposes of clause (ii) only to the
extent of the greater of -
(I) its stated redemption price, or
(II) its liquidation preference. 3
(C) Stock of parent corporation. For purposes of this
paragraph, stock of a corporation in control (within the
meaning of section 368(c)) of the debtor corporation shall
be treated as stock of the debtor corporation.30 4
(D) Limitation on stock-for-debt exception.
(i) In general. In the case of an exchange to which
clause (i) of paragraph (B) applies, the debtor
corporation shall be required to reduce its tax
attributes pursuant to subsection (b), on the date on
which a creditor that has received stock of the debtor
in exchange for its indebtedness sells or otherwise
disposes of such stock, by the excess of:
(I) the amount of such creditor's indebtedness
cancelled in the exchange, over
(II) the selling price of such stock, or, if such
stock was disposed of other than by sale, the fair
market value of the stock on the date of such
disposition.
302. For a detailed explanation of this ten percent safe harbor, see supra note 296
and accompanying text.
303. For a discussion of the treatment of preferred stock under this Article's
proposal, see supra notes 278-84 and accompanying text.
304. This subparagraph mirrors the language of I.R.C. § 108(e)(7) (1994), which
outlines the creditor's tax consequences in a stock-for-debt exchange, by providing that
stock of a debtor's parent corporation will be considered stock of the debtor for purposes
of the stock-for-debt exception. For a comprehensive discussion of the parent stock issue
and how it is resolved under this proposal, see supra notes 285-91 and accompanying text.
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(ii) Two-year rule. If a creditor described in
paragraph (D) sells or otherwise disposes of the stock
of the debtor corporation received in a stock-for-debt
exchange within the two-year period beginning on the
date of such exchange, the tax attribute reduction
described in clause (i) above shall not occur until the
first sale or other disposition of such stock following
the expiration of such two-year period.
C. Responding to Anticipated Criticisms of the Proposal
Critics of the stock-for-debt exception might attempt to attack the
proposal set forth in this Article on two alternative grounds. First, they
might argue that reinstating the exception will encourage financially
distressed corporations to file for bankruptcy relief rather than attempting
to restructure their debt through a less costly informal workout, thereby
violating traditional notions of tax efficiency. Second, they might
criticize the proposal on the grounds that it violates the fundamental tax
principle of horizontal equity and adds unnecessary complexity to the
Code. As discussed more fully below, these criticisms are without merit.
1. EFFICIENCY CONCERNS: THE PROPOSAL WOULD ENCOURAGE
BANKRUPTCY OVER INFORMAL WORKOUTS
A leading bankruptcy scholar, Kenneth Kies, was one of the
principal proponents of repealing the stock-for-debt exception in the early
1990s. In an influential article, Kies argued that the stock-for-debt
exception violated one of the basic principles of tax policy: tax efficiency.
According to Kies's definition of efficiency, the income tax system
should minimize the extent to which taxpayers attempt to alter their
economic behavior in order to avoid incurring an income tax liability. °5
"'The principle of efficiency implies that the best tax is one which
interferes as little as possible with individuals' choices regarding their
economic activity.' 30 6 Thus, a criticism that will likely be waged against
this Article's proposal to reinstate the stock-for-debt exception is that the
proposal violates traditional notions of tax efficiency by encouraging
financially troubled corporations to restructure their debt in bankruptcy,
rather than through an informal workout, in order to avail themselves of
the exception.0 7
305. Kies, supra note 247, at 1625.
306. Id. at 1623 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 101ST CONG.,
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 35 (1990)).
307. Kies, supra note 247, at 1625:
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This argument -is without merit for two reasons. First, the stock-for-
debt exception would be available both to corporations in bankruptcy
(whether solvent or insolvent) and to insolvent corporations that
restructure their debt outside bankruptcy through an informal workout.
Thus, it would be only solvent debtors who choose an informal workout
over bankruptcy that could not avail themselves of the stock-for-debt
exception.
Second, the criticism that corporations will improperly choose
bankruptcy over an informal workout solely because of the stock-for-debt
exception is premised on the assumption that informal workouts are
somehow superior to bankruptcy proceedings in all instances-an
assumption that is simply untrue. Consider, for example, the following
excerpt from the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, which outlines some of the non-tax advantages of
bankruptcy over an informal workout:
The out-of-court procedure . . . is quick and inexpensive.
However, it requires near universal agreement of the business's
creditors, and is limited in the relief it can provide for an
overextended business. When an out-of-court arrangement is
inadequate to rehabilitate a business, the bankruptcy laws
provide an alternative. An arrangement or reorganization
accomplished under the Bankruptcy Act binds nonconsenting
creditors, and permits more substantial restructuring of a
debtor's finances than does an out-of-court work-out. °8
In addition, the bankruptcy court has nationwide jurisdiction over all
creditors, thus alleviating the need to locate and obtain jurisdiction over
each creditor separately. Bankruptcy also enhances the debtor
corporation's ability to obtain new loans from lenders because post-
petition lenders are accorded special priority status under the Bankruptcy
Code.30 9  Finally, a debtor in bankruptcy can reject certain executory
contracts and is afforded the protection of the automatic stay, which
freezes all collection actions pending against the debtor.310 These non-tax
The availability of the stock-for-debt exception may act to encourage
bankruptcy filings that are otherwise unnecessary. Corporations that are about
to restructure their debts are counseled by their tax advisors to consider
entering chapter 11, to utilize the stock-for-debt exception, even if the
taxpayer is solvent in a balance sheet sense.
Id.; see also Zachary & Greenwald, supra note 47, at 149 ("This disparity [between
taxpayers inside and outside bankruptcy] may . . . put undue pressure on certain
corporations to seek title II protection as part of effective tax planning.").
308. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
6179-80.
309. Pratt, supra note 34, at 24 n.5; Sheppard, supra note 229, at 699; see also 11
U.S.C. § 364(c) (1994).
310. Pratt, supra note 34, at 24 n.5; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 365 (1994).
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advantages of bankruptcy over an informal workout make it an attractive
alternative even in the absence of the stock-for-debt exception.31'
Because the bankruptcy system offers a number of benefits
unavailable outside of bankruptcy, Mr. Kies may be correct that
financially distressed corporations might elect to file a chapter 11
reorganization petition rather than attempting an informal workout, but
not because of the availability of the stock-for-debt exception, which
would apply equally to insolvent debtors in informal workouts. If
Congress wants to alter the dichotomy favoring bankruptcy proceedings
over insolvency workouts, the entire bankruptcy system should be
examined, not just piecemeal tax provisions. 1 2
2. HORIZONTAL EQUITY AND SIMPLICITY CONCERNS
In addition to their efficiency concerns, opponents of the stock-for-
debt exception have argued vociferously that it violated two other
fundamental goals of tax policy: horizontal equity and simplicity.3"3 It is
true that a well-established principle of tax law states that for a tax system
to be equitable, it must at a minimum achieve horizontal equity.3 14
Horizontal equity is satisfied if taxpayers in equal positions are treated
equally.315 Of course, defining when taxpayers are in equal positions is
often difficult. For example, two single taxpayers earning identical
amounts will have different tax burdens if one taxpayer owns a home
while the other rents a home. This is so because Congress has decided to
encourage home ownership by allowing deductions for interest paid on a
home mortgage, while not allowing a deduction for rent paid on a
311. Rollyson, supra note 219, at A20.
312. There are those who favor abolishing the entire chapter I I system because it
is not economically efficient, allowing weak corporations to survive and undermining the
notion that the marketplace will "weed out" the weakest players. This Article is premised
on the assumption that chapter I I is necessary to preserve jobs and promote competition,
thereby ultimately strengthening the overall economy. A debate over the efficacy of the
entire chapter II system is beyond the scope of this Article.
313. See, e.g., Kies, supra note 247, at 1623.
314. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 14 (1984)
[hereinafter 1984 TREASURY REPORT] ("A tax that places significantly different burdens on
taxpayers in similar economic circumstances is not fair."); Richard A. Musgrave, ET, OT
and SBT, 6 J. PuB. ECON. 3, 4-5 (1976), reprinted in RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 260, 260-61 (1986); see also Stuart Rosow, The
Treasury's Tax Reform Proposals: Not a "Fair" Tax, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 58, 61
(1984). Of course, an equitable tax system must also achieve vertical equity, in which
taxpayers having differing income levels "pay differing proportions of their income in
tax." Id.; see also MUSGRAVE, supra, at 261. The current system's progressive tax rate
structure is said to achieve vertical equity, although not all scholars have accepted this
conclusion. See, e.g., Rosow, supra, at 62.
315. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 314, at 261; see also S. REP. No. 99-313, pt. 2, at
4 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. 4.
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principal residence.1 6 Thus, taxpayers with identical income levels are
not equally situated if there is a valid policy justification for treating the
two taxpayers differently by, for example, allowing expenses of only one
taxpayer to be deducted against income.317
Thus, if Congress seriously considers this proposal, critics of the
stock-for-debt exception will surely attack the proposal as inconsistent
with notions of horizontal equity. "The exception causes taxpayers to be
treated differently, merely because of their status as bankrupt or insolvent
debtors. The exception, therefore, creates an uneven playing field... ,,318
These critics will argue that the stock-for-debt exception gives taxpayers a
"head start" rather than a "fresh start. 319
The response to this criticism is obvious. Financially troubled
corporations that are insolvent or involved in chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings are not in an equal position with financially solvent
corporations for two reasons. First, bankrupt and insolvent corporations
are financially unable to pay any tax due on cancellation of indebtedness
income, while solvent corporations are financially able to do so.
310
Second, and more importantly, the stock of a solvent corporation not in
bankruptcy can be valued with reasonable accuracy, often on an
established securities exchange. 32' Thus, the amount of its discharge of
indebtedness income can be easily determined at the time of the stock-for-
debt exchange. Conversely, the stock of an insolvent corporation or one
in bankruptcy cannot be valued accurately.322 It is therefore impossible to
calculate the amount of its discharge of indebtedness income at the time
316. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998). One could certainly argue
that there is no valid policy justification for encouraging home ownership over home
rental, but that is beyond the scope of this Article.
317. Much of this paragraph, including the definition of horizontal equity, was
taken from Michelle Amopol Cecil, Toward Adding Further Complexity to the Internal
Revenue Code: A New Paradigm for the Deductibility of Capital Losses, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1083, 1128-29.
318. Kenneth J. Kies, Repeal the Stock-For-Debt Exception, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
July-Aug. 1993, at 18, 41; see also Williams, supra note 38, at 174 ("The stock-for-debt
exception violates the horizontal equity principle because it allows insolvent and title II
taxpayers to preserve their tax attributes while it prevents solvent taxpayers from doing the
same."). It is interesting to note that, in another article, Kies also attacked the exception as
a violation of horizontal equity, defining the term as follows: "taxpayers with similar
incomes should pay similar amounts of tax." Kies, supra note 247, at 1623. This is not,
however, the widely accepted definition of horizontal equity.
319. Kies, supra note 318, at 42. One commentator responded that the "head
start" argument was a "shibboleth," and the terms "head start" and "fresh start" were
merely "anodynes for the pains of reasoning." Asofsky, supra note 23, at 13-78 (quoting
Judge Learned Hand in Comm'r v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287
U.S. 667 (1932)).
320. Wayne I. Danson & Sharon P. Lyle, Stock-for-Debt Exception is Essential,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., July-Aug. 1993, at 41-42.
321. For a more comprehensive discussion of these stock valuation issues, see
supra note 251 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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of the exchange. Thus, waiting until creditors that receive stock in the
exchange sell or dispose of their stock before determining the debtor's
discharge of indebtedness income does not violate notions of horizontal
equity; it does, however promote fundamental fairness.323
Opponents of reinstating the exception are also likely to criticize it
for violating another goal of tax policy: simplicity. "The stock-for-debt
exception, along with debt restructurings in general, presents difficult and
complex implementation issues . . . . The repeal of the stock-for-debt
exception clearly would lessen some of that complexity. 3 24  It is
conceded that the proposal outlined herein will not simplify the Internal
Revenue Code. A mere glance at the multi-page proposed statutory
language bears witness to the added complexity that this proposal will
create. Yet complexity is inevitable because human circumstances and
financial transactions take so many forms.325
The desire to simplify the Code is not a new idea. Thomas Adams
once stated that he would "vote for simplicity and inequality, selecting
many simple taxes at light rates rather than more equitable but more
complex taxes at heavier rates. 326 Yet however old the desire for tax
simplification might be, attempts at broad scale simplification of the Code
have failed miserably. For example, one of the three principal goals of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to create a simpler tax system.327 The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 did not, however, achieve the simplification that
its drafters had so desired. Several explanations for this failure have been
offered. One of the most persuasive arguments, and one that echoes
Adams's dilemma, is that attempting to satisfy the dual goals of the
equitable distribution of tax burdens and the need for achieving certainty
in determining one's tax liability necessarily leads to complexity.328
323. It should be noted that the current Code already treats insolvent and bankrupt
corporations differently than solvent corporations for tax purposes. While the latter must
recognize discharge of indebtedness income currently, the former are entitled to forego
income recognition and instead reduce their tax attributes by a like amount. See supra
notes 67-85 and accompanying text. Yet no critics have argued that this difference in tax
treatment violates horizontal equity. Williams, supra note 38, at 174.
324. Kies, supra note 247, at 1626.
325. Much of the discussion that follows on the complexity issue is taken from
Cecil, supra note 317, at 1137-38.
326. Thomas S. Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35
Q.J. EcON. 527, 553 (1921).
327. S. REP. No. 99-313, pt 2, at 3-4 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. 3-4; see
also 1984 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 314, at 15:
An important goal of the Treasury Department study of fundamental tax
reform is simplification. During June of 1984, the Treasury Department held
hearings on fundamental tax reform in seven U.S. cities. One of the themes
repeated most frequently by citizens appearing at those hearings was the need
for simplification of the income tax.
Id.
328. Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can
Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REv. 151, 163-73 (1997); see also
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"Complexity is a bi-product of a tax regime's reconciliation of the lofty
aspiration to distribute tax burdens equitably and the mundane
requirement that the tax be susceptible to administration and
compliance. 329  It is simply impossible to achieve simplification in a
complex society.330
Moreover, empirical data suggest that "complication of a tax regime
is correlated with the amount of tax revenue that the regime raises. 33'
Thus, the federal income tax system, which raises and often redistributes
significant revenue each year, is likely to be more complex simply
because the stakes are so high.332 In addition, the specific needs
demanded by special interest groups and lawmakers' drafting competence
(or incompetence) also add to the complexity of the Code.333
In the final analysis, complexity is inevitable in a politically-based
tax system that often succumbs to interest group pressure.3 More
importantly, complexity may even be desirable because it promotes the
dual goals of equity and certainty.335 Until the goals of raising revenue
and implementing public policy are divorced from the Code-an unlikely
occurrence-the Code will retain its complexity in all its grandeur.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy scholars and policymakers cannot continue to ignore the
myriad tax issues that plague the chapter 11 bankruptcy system. Congress
has consistently undermined the rehabilitative goals of chapter 11 by
enacting ill-considered tax legislation without understanding its
bankruptcy policy implications. The repeal of the stock-for-debt
SIMONS, supra note 36, at 157 ("It is the main purpose of the income tax to secure an
equitable, progressive distribution of tax burdens among individuals.
329. Paul, supra note 328, at 155.
330. Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1,
2-3 (1974); see also Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990
Wis. L. REv. 1267, 1278.
331. Paul, supra note 328, at 173.
332. Bittker, supra note 330, at 2 ("When such a tax [the income tax] is imposed
on tens of millions of taxpayers at rates yielding tens of billions of dollars, only an
incorrigible optimist could expect the kind of simplicity that can be achieved with a poll
tax... Income taxation entails a high level of irreducible complexity.").
333. Paul, supra note 328, at 176-77:
[S]ince tax simplicity is not an ideal that is likely to develop its own
independent constituency, complicated, intractable, and incoherent legislation
is likely to ensue, according to the public choice view, as self-promoting
politicians pander to the special interests by sprinkling loopholes throughout
the federal income tax without any regard for the costs imposed on the rest of
society.
Id.
334. McCaffery, supra note 330, at 1304-07; Paul, supra note 328, at 164.
335. Paul, supra note 328, at 163. But see McCaffery, supra note 330, at 1268,
1284-87 (arguing that complexity often fails to promote equity).
1070
HeinOnline  -- 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 1070 2000
2000:1001 Reinstating the Stock-for-Debt Exception 1071
exception remains a glaring example of this growing. trend away from
responsible congressional decision-making.
Reinstating the stock-for-debt exception for insolvent corporations
and those involved in bankruptcy proceedings and strengthening it to
better comport with current tax policy will not solve all of the problems
inherent in the chapter 11 system. It will, however, bring Congress one
step closer to harmonizing bankruptcy and tax policy, and will move
chapter 11 one step closer to realizing its important goals of rehabilitating
financially distressed corporations, preserving jobs, and fostering
economic growth.
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